Applying Vendler's verbal categories to Mandarin Chinese and issues in telicity by Shih, Yuan-Lung
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Yuan-Lung Shih, BA Hons. 
, 
Supervised by Mr. Sean Alan Bowerman 
Applying Vendler's verbal categories to Mandarin 
Chinese and issues in telicity 
Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University 
of Cape Town, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the 
degree of Master of Arts in the Linguistics Section of the 
Department ofEnglish Language and Literature. 
Date: 29th November 2006 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
of the non-exclusive license granted to UCT by the author. 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Acknowledgements 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank my supervisor Mr. Sean A. Bowerman 
for his untiring efforts in guiding me throughout the dissertation and to Prof. Raj. 
Mesthrie for he opened the gate for me to study in linguistics. I also want to thank my 
parents for the financial assistance and my family for their unlimited support. 
I hereby declare that this is my own work in conception and execution. Any opinions 
expressed or conclusions reached are my own, unless otherwise indicated. 
M~ 2001 

ii 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Abstract 
Two different but related topics are addressed in this dissertation. The first concerns 
the ambiguous status of Vendler's activities in situation classification. Activities 
resemble states in terms of homogeneity but differ from events in terms of telicity. 
Also, activities resemble events in terms of heterogeneity but differ from states in 
terms of dynamicity. Classifying activities under either global category will result in 
contradictions. I propose to establish activities as neither a subcategory of global 
states nor that of global events, but an independent global category. 
The second topic concerns the issues of telicity in Mandarin Chinese (MC). Tai (1984, 
2003) argued that MC lacks accomplishment and achievement verbs and, therefore, 
telicity is derived only if a resultant predicate is overtly expressed. Lin (2004) made 
similar arguments - he claimed that except for a few cases, there are no 
monomorphemic telic verbs in MC. I argue that there are monomorphemic telic verbs 
in MC and they are the 'incremental-theme verbs'. When these verbs have quantified 
nominal complements, they are telic. They do not need an over resultative 
complement to express telicity. The addition of resultant predicates will be 
semantically redundant if we have a quantized VP modified by perfective viewpoint 
aspect (PVA). Although the addition of a resultant state does not affect the 
grammaticality, it merely specifies what th~ result is, and is irrelevant to affect the 
conditions for telicity. Consequently, the chim that the overt expression of resultant 
predicates is the only way to derive telicity in MC is too strong. 
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Chapter 1 Introductory 
Verkuyl (1993: 40) points out that Vendler's (1957) categorization of verbs (in terms 
of states, activities 1, achievements and accomplishments is influential in the 
subsequent development of aspectology. He explains the widespread influence of 
Vendler's categories from the view that myriad human experiences in the real world 
can be classified by linguistic criteria and the resulting categories can show insights of 
how human beings perceive the world from the prism of linguistic rules (p. 39). Some 
situations2 last a long time, some last a short time; some become different situations 
at the end, some remain unchanged; some need time to develop, some happen in an 
instant. In language, we have different devices to express them, for example, 
progressives serve to indicate that a situation is happening; perfectives to indicate that 
a dynamic situation3 takes place completely; resultatives to indicate that a situation 
changes and becomes a new situation, and so on. Now we can correlate situations in 
the real world and their linguistic expressions (that is, verbs and verb-related issues) 
on the one hand, and correlate the linguistic expressions and the linguistic devices 
exemplified above, on the other. Since in the latter both are in the same realm, it is 
possible to compare verbs according to various linguistic criteria (ibid.). Vendler 
(1957)4, for instance, uses progressives (or continuous tense in his term) to distinguish 
between verbs that admit it and those that don't. This is how Vendler's first two 
primary categories are born 5. Verbs that admit progressives are activities and 
Please note that activities and processes are interchangeable in this dissertation. 
2 This term in this dissertation serves to be the umbrella term for Vendler's four categories. In this 
context, it refers to the real world situations from which Vendler's categories are reflected. 
3 This term refers to events, that is, non-static situations. This will become clear at the latter stage. 
4 Vendler's paper was originally published in The Philosophical Review (1957: 143 160). The 
version used here is extracted from Schopf (ed.) (1974). 
5 Vendler did not spell out what these two primary categories are. Verkuyl and Binnick note that 
Vendler's classification has its origins in Aristotle's Metaphysics, so there must be some connections 
between these two primary categories and Aristotle's energia and kinesis. I thus assume that Vendler's 
states and achievements are connected with energia, and his activities and accomplishments with 
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accomplishments; those that do not are states and achievements. From here, Vendler 
subdivides the former in terms of STP (set terminal point, or climax 1974: 219), so we 
have activities (without a STP) and accomplishments (with a STP). As Vendler's 
subdivides the latter in terms of duration, we have states and achievements. States last 
a long time while achievements are momentary (p. 221). 
Linguists following Vendler apply his verbal categorization in their own specific 
language, and as Verkuyl observes, 'even though the specific linguistic criteria may 
vary across different languages, every language can produce congenial criteria so as 
to give the Vendler-quadripartition a solid grounding' (1989: 39). I found one general 
direction in the subsequent works extending from Vendler (1957): linguists first 
redefine what linguistic criteria necessarily are and then test the supposed criteria in a 
specific language. In the course of categorical refinement, new terminology develops 
for the purpose of distinguishing from Vendler's own; and if these are inadequate, 
more categories are added. Vendler's quadripartition seems to be the source of 
inspiration, and this is evident in Mourelatos (1981), Moens and Steedman (1988), 
Smith (1991), Kritka (1992)6 and Parsons (1994). Whether they agree or disagree 
with Vendler's categorization, Vendler's quadripartition or its equivalent is 
consistently applied. Tai (1984) was the first Chinese linguist to apply Vendler's 
quadripartition to Mandarin Chinese (MC), but surprisingly, his findings show that 
accomplishments and achievements are lacking in MC. Twenty years later, Lin 
(2004) 7 points out that Tai's MC data merely suggest that the so-called 
accomplishments and achievements are actually 'verbal compounds or unbounded 
activities that do not encode explicit end points or end states' (2004: 55). Lin 
kinesis. 
6 Please see # 2 in Internet Bibliography. 
Please see # 4 in Internet Bibliography. 
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considers Tai's findings not explicit, so he takes a step further by formalizing Tai's 
findings and summarizes it in (I): 
(1) 	 (a) For the most part, activity and state are the only two primitive verbal types 
in Mandarin Chinese. As a general rule, change of state predicates 
(accomplishments and achievements) are derived syntactically. 
(b) With very few exceptions, no monomorphemic verbs in Mandarin are telic ­
no monomorphemic verb encodes a result, a natural end point, an end state, or 
the attainment of a goal. 
(c) The particle Ie signals inchoativity. 

(Lin 2004: 53) 

A good example of Lin's is the contrast between activity verb look for ~ zhao and 
achievement verb find t~ zhao lU dao (Lin 2004: 61). The English .lind is what Lin 
refers to as 'monomorphemic telic verb' and, according to Lin's (1 b), its equivalent is 
absent in MC. t~ zhao lookfor consists of only one morpheme, whereas ~ zhao lU 
consists of two morphemes. We can easily note that both have an identical, underlying 
character jtzhiio. Lin's claim in (lb) says that this mono morphemic character:R zhao 
is not telic and if it has to be, it must be derived from the combination with lU dao 
arrive. The second character lU dao arrive specifies the successful attainment of the 
goal8. Lin (2004: 61 - 62) notes that this morpheme lL dao arrive is productive, so he 
attempts to explain it from the syntactic derivations ofresultatives in his dissertation. 
Not only Lin, but also Shi (1988: 59) cited in Lin (2004: 55) similarly argues that in 
8 I think arrive has a meaning of 'reaching the desired destination' and this is why it is connected 
in this context. The use ofarrive in MC could be connected to the discussion of endpoints in the 
literature (cf. Smith 1991). In MC ttl dao could be the lexicalized, overt expression of endpoints; hence 
it is associated with telicity. 
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languages states and activities are the 'only' two primitive verbal categories, while 
accomplishments and achievements are complex categories. 
Lin's claim in (1 a) is built from Shi. As we can see from Tai (1984; 2003), Shi (1988) 
and Lin (2004), there seems to be a tradition in Chinese linguistics that challenges 
Vendler's quadripartition. If we follow them and apply (l) to 1i gai build, xie 
write, and :t hua paint - the Chinese equivalents of Vendler's canonical 
accomplishment verbs - we might agree that unless we add a resultative complement 
like wan finish to denote the termination, there are no sources provided for 
deriving telicity. These authors consider these single character verbs to be inherently 
atelic. The verbs are thus not accomplishments but activities, and from here, we could 
question the universality ofVendler's categories and suggest that Vendler's categories 
are language specific (e.g. English and its family). This is why almost two decades 
later, Tai (2003)9 advances linguistic relativism by arguing that 'English speakers 
tend to attend relatively more to the process of an event, but, in contrast, Chinese 
relatively more to the result' (2003: 311). One of my aims in this dissertation is to 
show that Lin's claim (1 b) is too strong to capture the complex aspectual interactions 
between the mass-count properties of nouns and telic-ateHc properties of verbs. What 
these properties refer to will become clearer when I discuss the aspectual 
compositionality, especially in connection with Mourelatos (1981), Verkuyl (1989) 
and Kritka (1992). 
A different approach to Vendler is Verkuyl (1972, 1989, 1993). Unlike the 
above-mentioned Chinese linguists, who tested Vendler's categories in MC and found 
that his accomplishments and achievements do not fit well, Verkuyl seems to indicate 
9 Please see # 6 in Internet Bibliography_ 
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Vendler's quadripartition is unnecessary. 'I proposed that aspect be "taken away" 
from the verb and be assigned to higher levels of sentential structure' (Verkuyl 1989: 
40). Verkuyl's strategy is to compose aspect at the sentential level: aspect is the result 
of the sentential components (i.e. verbs, internal and external arguments, 
adjuncts ... etc.). Because of this, a predefined category according to some fixed 
linguistic criteria does not help here: a predefined verbal category will be dissolved 
eventually when all components are taken into aspectual calculation. Verkuyl's 
suggestion reduces the necessity of categorizing lexical items at the verb level. 
Following Verkuyl, one could say that categorization at the verb level becomes 
meaningless as the overall aspectual composition overwrites the categorization at any 
level below the sentential level. It is thus not necessary to classify verbs into different 
categories by formulating criteria, but it is necessary to capture the compositional 
conditions or properties that co-determine the overall aspectual interpretation. For 
Verkuyl, formulating aspectual compositionality and establishing Vendler's 
quadripartition of verbs are not compatible. 'In my view, these two things cannot be 
married as they are incompatible: if aspect formation is a process at a structural level 
it is hard to see how a lexical division can be maintained' (ibid.). 
A short history of the studies in aspect is outlined in Tenny and Pustejovksy (2000: 
4 - 7). Tenny and Pustejovksy rightly comment that verb meanings have aspectual 
and temporal structure and this can be traced back to Aristotle's Metaphysics 10 (p. 4). 
Ryle (1949) and Kenny (1963) discussed the ontological distinctions between 
Aristotle's energia (states) and kinesis (events) first in philosophy and 'from there 
they found their way into the linguistic literature' (p. 5). Vendler's temporal schemata 
(1974: 223 224) is the attempt to categorize verbs in terms of different temporal 
10 In particular, the passage in Metaphysics 1048b. 18 - 36 (Aristotle 1933: 449). 
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structures. Following Tenny and Pustejovsky's interpretation of Vendler's temporal 
schemata, verbs that have 'temporal duration' (ibid.) are activities and 
accomplishments, and those that lack it are states and achievements. Activities and 
accomplishments are distinguished further in terms of 'temporal termination' (ibid.). 
Activities such as walk do not have temporal termination, so they are ongoing 
situations. Accomplishments such as build have temporal termination, so they will 
reach an endpoint. States differ from achievements in terms of 'internal change' (ibid.): 
states such as be happy remain unchanged while achievements such as reach the 
summit undergo changes within the time span. Classifying verbs in terms of temporal 
duration, temporal termination and internal change within the time span reflects that 
Vendler considers time to be an inherent property of verbs and weighs temporal 
factors higher than any non-temporal factors. According to Tenny and Pustejovsky, in 
the subsequent development of aspectology, temporal structure gives way to 
non-temporal structure: 
It is also now generally accepted that we must talk about the aspectual properties 
of the verb phrase or the clause, rather than simply the aspectual properties of the 
verb, since many factors including adverbial modification and the nature of the 
object noun phrase interact with whatever aspectual properties the verb starts out 
with. (Tenny and Pustejovsky 2000: 6) 
Linguists have been gradually aware of the fact that the aspectual properties of verbs 
alone are not sufficient to determine the aspectual properties of VPs or the entire 
sentence. Factors such as adverbial modification (e.g. Dowty's in-a-time versus 
for-a-time test cited in Tenny (1994: 5 - 6)), the property of the internal argument (e.g. 
mass or count, definite or indefinite, and Accusative versus Partitive Case) should be 
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taken into account for telicity. This is evident in Verkuyl (1972, 1989, 1993). 
Verkuyl's compositional aspectual theory (1989: 79) captures the interactions between 
the verbal properties [±ADD TO], the nominal properties [±SQA]ll and their results 
[±T] (Termination). Verkuyl (1989: 79 81) shows that only [+ADD TO] and [+SQA] 
result in [+ T], otherwise [- T]. [+T] refers to terminative and [-T] refers to durative in 
Verkuyl's terminology (ibid.). Verkuyl identifies his [+ ADD TO] as Vendler's [+ 
Process], and he uses Vendler's definition of processes 'successive phases following 
one another' (Vendler 1974: 219) for [+ADD TO] (p. 81). This means that verbs that 
possess [+ADD TO] have successive phases following one another, and [+ADD TO] 
is the property due to which we can divide and add up the internal phases of a 
situation described by such verbs. Verkuyl's example walk (p. 81), for instance, 
possess [+ADD TO], because one's walk can be divided to several successive phases 
(e.g. walk to the bookshop, then walk to the grocery ...etc.) and every distance can be 
added up. On the other hand, the nominal property [+SQA] stands for 'Specified 
Quantity of A' (ibid.). The property [+SQA] pertains to all quantized DPs. Verkuyl's 
example/our tables (p. 82), for instance, possess [+SQA]. Mass nouns or bare plurals 
lack [+ SQA]. It is thus certain that Verkuyl's terminative and durative correspond to 
telicity and atelicity respectively, the more widespread terms discussed in the 
literature. 
Verkuyl is not alone in advocating for aspectual composition. Krifka (1992, 1998) 
similarly argues that telicity and atelicity are the result of the interactions between the 
nominal reference (nominal domain) and temporal constitution (verbal domain). Still, 
11 Please note that SQA stands for 'Specified Quantity of A', and A is the 'interpretation of the 
Noun Phrase' (Verkuyl 1989: 81). 
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Krifka (1992) makes use of Vendler's quadripartition when discussing the temporal 
constitution of the verbal domain. Unlike Verkuyl, Krifka explains telicity from the 
perspective of mappings between events and objects. Two results can be derived from 
the mappings. After mappings, predicates can be cumulative or quantized. Only 
quantized predicates are telic. Garey (1957), Platzack (1979) as cited in Krifka (1998), 
Mourelatos (1981), Smith (1991), Tenny (1994), Van Hout (2000) and Thompson 
(2006) and many others work on the same direction of aspectual compositionality. As 
the trend of aspectual compositionality becomes more influential nowadays, one 
could question whether the aspectual composition of any kind should supersede 
Vendler's quadripartition. 
Although Vendler orientated his classification of verbs on temporal schemata, some of 
his non-temporal factors cannot be neglected. I find that his 'set terminal point' (STP) 
or 'climax' (1974: 219) has significant linkage to Comrie's definition of telicity 
(1976), Moens and Steedman's culmination (1988), Smith's endpoint approach (1991) 
and Krifka's mappings between events and objects (1992). All authors above, except 
for Comrie, make use of Vendler's quadripartition in their work, though they extend 
the usage ofthe quadripartition not only to denote single verbs but also the entire VPs. 
From my understanding of the works of these authors, STP can be considered as an 
abstract endpoint where the successive internal processes of a situation eventually 
lead to an outcome, a new change of state. In the proposed event structure of Moens 
and Steedman (1988: 18), situations that possess a STP culminate, after which a 
consequent state is present to ensure the successful happening of the culminated 
situation. In Smith's endpoint approach (1991), telic situations have a natural endpoint 
8 
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(or an inherent STP), while atelic situations have an 'arbitrary endpoint,12 (p. 29). 
Comrie describes Vendler's STP as 'a well-defined terminal point' (1976: 45), and 
according to which, it is a criterion for telic situations. These connections are not 
accidentaL Therefore, I would suggest that, while advancing aspectual 
compositionality on the one hand, it is not harmful to retain Vendler's quadripartition 
to generalize verbs and characterize VPs. Perhaps it is more important to analyze the 
properties pertaining to each category than to merely label verbs and VPs in terms of 
Vendler's quadripartition. 
Besides STP, another of Vendler's non-temporal factors is 'homogeneity' (1974: 220), 
which appears frequently in the literature. Mourelatos (1981) shows that the 
mass-count properties are inherently not only in nouns but also in verbs, and the 
correlation between nouns and verbs in terms of mass-count properties suggests that 
states are like mass nouns, e.g. water, intrinsically homogeneous, processes are like 
quantified mass nouns, e.g. a cup of water, which are homogeneous but 
individualizable, while events are like count nouns, e.g. an apple, which are 
heterogeneous and individualizable (p. 209 - 210). Herweg (1991) distinguishes 
between global states and global events wholly in terms of homogeneity and 
heterogeneity. Krifka's explainations for cumulativity and quantization (1992: 33) are 
also related to Vendler's homogeneity. 
From the perspective of the authors above, properties distinguishing between 
categories are homogeneity, dynamicity, durativity and telicity. What these terms 
exactly mean will become clearer as the dissertation unfolds. Among these terms, I 
12 In Smith (1991: 29), her original terminology is natural final point and arbitrary final point 
respectively for telic and atelic situation types. I will use natural/inherent endpoint and arbitrary 
endpoint for the same purpose in this dissertation. 
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will highlight telicity and apply Krifka's mappings between events and objects to Me. 
Recall that earlier I have mentioned Tai's (1984, 2003) and Lin's (2004) challenges to 
Vendler's accomplishments and achievements. From my application of Krifka's 
quantization and cumulativity to Me, I will suggest that Tai's and Lin's claims are too 
strong to capture the aspectual interaction between incremental theme verbs, specified 
QPs and the perfective morpheme Ie. The term 'incremental-theme verbs' (Dowty 
1991, Tenny 1994: 15 - 16) refers to verbs that have a Theme argument and the 
Theme argument undergoes changes incrementally, and such incremental changes 
'correspond to the temporal progress of the event' (Tenny 1994: 15). Tenny's 
incremental-theme verbs are verbs of creation and consumption (ibid.); they are the 
canonical Vendlerian accomplishment verbs, so I could sense that incremental theme 
verbs typically bear Verkuyl's [+ADD TO] property. My specified QPs are quantized 
nouns and thus have Verkuyl's [+SQA] property. I will develop my arguments against 
Tai's and Lin's strong claims in chapter 3. At this stage, it is necessary to summarize 
where I agree and disagree with them. 
(2) 	 My agreements with Tai (1984, 2003) and Lin (2004) 
(a) 	 States and processes are the two primitive categories in Me. 
(b) 	 Telic predicates such as accomplishments and achievements can be derived 
by resultative compounds. 
(3) 	 My disagreements with Tai (1984, 2003) and Lin (2004) 
(a) 	 Monomorphemic incremental theme verbs exist In Me and they are 
inherently telic, without exceptions. 
(b) 	 Though (2b) is true, resultative compounds are not the only way to derive 
telicity in Me. 
10 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
I will start chapter 2 with a survey of situation classifications. Tenny and Pustejovksy 
(2000: 5) note that various authors categorize Vendler's fourfold categories in 
different subgroups and the most basic distinction is 'between statives on the one 
hand and non-statives (events) on the other'. This most basic distinction is binary ­
situations are classified either as global states or as global events. It has been 
suggested that these two global categories are already fundamental in the contrast 
between energia and kinesis in Aristotle's Metaphysics (Binnick 1991). However, 
disputes occur in the literature over the ambivalent status of Vendler's activity class. 
Particularly, Herweg (1991) classifies activities under global states. Another group of 
authors, exemplified by Smith (1999), classifies activities under global events. From 
Herweg (1991) and Smith (1999), one can see that Vendler's activity class is a fuzzy 
area and I find it necessary to clarify this issue before advancing to aspectual 
compositionality of telicity. 
Instead of arguing for the 'correct' status of activity class, I want to establish 
processes as an independent, primitive global category. To be honest, this idea 
partially comes from the passage (4) from Shi (1988: 59) cited in Lin (2004: 55) and 
partially from Pustejovksy's event structure of transition (1991). This idea also echoes 
Lin's claim in (1a), but our orientations are different. Whereas Lin's claim in (1a) 
applies to Me specifically, I want to suggest that that is also possible in languages. 
11 
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(4) Shi's generalization 
Achievements are basically states, but they differ from states in that they 
describe new states, i.e., change of state. Accomplishments are basically 
activities, but they differ from activities in that they encode causative activities. 
(Shi 1988: 59) cited in Lin (2004: 55) 
The term 'change of state' in Shi's passage above is linked to telicity in the literature. 
In Pustejovsky (1991: 56), telic situations (or Transition in his terminology) always 
have a change of state as the result of the developmental process. In Dowty (1991: 
572), 'change of state' is one of the contributing properties for his PATIENT 
Proto-Role: PATIENT argument undergoes change of state, and what causes the 
PATIENT argument to undergo change of state is AGENT argument (ibid.). From here, 
we see that telicity is also relevant to argument structure. 
This dissertation centres on telicity. Telicity is a central area in the studies of aspect, 
and from this central field several important topics extend, for example verbal 
classifications (Vendler 1957, Kenny 1963), aspectual compositionality (Verkuyl 1972, 
1989,1993), boundness (Jackendoff 1991,1996; Depraetere 1995; Thompson 2006), 
endpoints (Smith 1991), culmination (Moens and Steedman 1988; Parsons 1994), 
mappings between objects and events (Krifka 1992, 1998) and perfectivity under 
event realization (Bohnemeyer and Swift 2004). Actually, many of the 
above-mentioned topics overlap and fonn a complex web of interrelations. I will not 
provide a comprehensive review of all the related topics here, so I will have to narrow 
the scope of my research. Since stative predicates are inherently atetic, they are not 
very relevant to the discussions about telicity. I will delimit my scope by applying 
Krifka's cumulativity and quantization to contrast the different aspectual 
12 
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compositionality between activity verbs and incremental theme verbs in Me. My aim 
is to show that Tai's (1984, 2003) and Lin's (2004) accounts for telicity in Me are too 
strong. To do this, I need to explain (i) in which circumstances resultatives are 
obligatory to express telicity and why, (ii) in which circumstances resultatives are not 
obligatory and why. Some puzzling problems occur, though they are not really related 
to the main contents of this dissertation (but they are related to argument structure and 
aspect). Nevertheless, I will point out the problems encountered during my research 
and give hints for future research in the conclusion. 
13 
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Chapter 2 States, Processes and Events 13 
My focus in this chapter is not to establish linguistic criteria and classify verbs 
accordingly, but to explore the ambivalent status of Vendler's activities from various 
authors' classifications of predicates. Classifying verbs into different categories was 
popular and fruitful in 1970s and 1980s. Why research in this area again? I found it 
necessary to clarify the fuzzy status ofVendler's activities between states and events. 
Herweg's and Smith's opposite approaches to the classification of processes show that 
ambivalent status of processes is a major area of disagreement among linguists. To do 
this, I will make a survey of various authors' situation classifications first, compare 
their differences, and then conclude that processes should be classified neither under 
global states nor under global events. At the end of this chapter, I will attempt to 
connect progressives and processes, arguing that they share similar properties. My 
motivation for doing this is to solve Dowty's Imperfective Paradox (1977, 1979). 
13 Please note that states refer to Vendler's states, processes to his activities and events here refer 
to accomplishments and achievements. 
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2.1 A survey of situation classifications 
2.1.1 From Aristotle to Vendler 
Verkuyl (1989: 39) notes that Vendler (1957) and Kenny (1963) 'both go back to 
Aristotle for their inspiration', and all the subsequent works on situation 
classifications have their root in Aristotle's contrast between energia and kinesis. Let's 
see Aristotle's passage below: 
For it is not the same thing which at the same time is walking and has walked, or 
is building and has built, or is becoming and has become, or is being moved and 
has been moved, but two different things; and that which is causing motion is 
different from that which has caused motion. But the same thing at the same time 
is seeing and has seen, is thinking and has thought. The latter kind of process, 
then, is what I mean by actualization, and the former what I mean by motion l4 . 
(Metaphysics 1048b. 18 36 (Aristotle 1933: 449), cited in Binnick (1991: 143)) 
Aristotle's examples of 'see' and 'think' can be linked to Vendler's states: they are the 
same thing at the same time. 'Build' is Vendler's accomplishment verb, as what is 
being built and what has been built is not the same thing. What is being built is an 
unfinished object, while what has been built is a concrete one. However, one can 
reject that Aristotle's 'is walking' and 'has walked' are different things. According to 
Dowty's homogeneity criteria (1979: 59) cited in Verkuyl (1989: 53), if V is an 
activity verb, then x V-ed Jor y time entails that at any time x V-ed was true. The 
14 The tenn 'actualization' refers to energia, and motion to kinesis. In this thesis, the tenn energia 
refers to states, and kinesis to non-states (events). 
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entailment is true because the V is homogeneous in structure. If we follow DO\\1y's 
homogeneous criterion, John was walking for one hour entails that John walked for 
one hour, which also entails that John has walked for one hour. So, although modern 
situation classifications have their roots in Aristotle, modern scholars seem to differ 
from Aristotle in that activity class is 'homogeneous' in their treatment (ibid.). As we 
will see in my survey, modern linguists no longer talk about the differentiation 
between 'what is causing motion' and 'what has caused motion', but between 
culminated situations and non-culminated situations. The term 'culmination' (Moens 
and Steedman 1988: 16) is an inherent verbal property pertaining to verbs that have a 
natural STP. Now, we can move to Vendler's quadripartition. 
Vendler's fourfold classifications of verbs are exemplified in (5) and his linguistic 
criteria can be summarized in (6) (1974: 218 224). 
(5) (a) States: know, love, believe 
(b) Activities: run, write, push (a cart) 
(c) Accomplishments: run a mile, draw a circle, write a letter 
(d) Achievements: recognize, reach the summit. find 

(Vendler 1974: 218 - 224 passim.) 
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(6) A summary ofVendler's methods (ibid.) 
STA ACH ACT ACC 
(a) What are you doing? x x ./ ./ 
I (b) What do you do? x x ./ ./ 
x 
. (c) At what time did x V? x ./ x 
(d) For how long did x V? ./ x ./ 
(e) How long did it take x to V? x x x ./ 
(STA: states; ACH: achievements; ACT: activities; ACC: accomplishments; 
./: appropriate; x: not appropriate) 
As (6a) shows, the admission of continuous tenses is the primary criterion for 
distinguishing states and achievements from activities and accomplishments. 
Following Vendler's explanation, activities and accomplishments have 'successive 
phases following one another in time' (1974: 219), while states and achievements lack 
this property. If a situation has this property, it makes sense to ask questions like (6b). 
Because of the successive phases following one another in time, we can decompose 
one's running, in Vendler's example, into several movements (lifting up right leg, 
dropping it and so forth), but we cannot decompose one's knowing something into 
several movements. This is how Vendler's global categories are born. Due to this 
criterion, states and achievements form one genus, while activities and 
accomplishments form the other. 
Accomplishments and activities can be further distinguished in the sense of (6d) and 
(6e). There is an inherent STP (ibid.) in accomplishments, but this is not so in 
activities. The answer for (6e) reflects that the temporal length exactly delimits the 
STP. On the other hand, the answer for (6d) reflects that the temporal length is given 
but does not delimit the STP: the situation described can continue without being 
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interrupted. The contrast between situations with and without inherent STP is 
important. Following Vendler (1974: 219 220), if John ran for 30 minutes and then 
ran for another 15 minutes, the statement that John ran is true. If John drew a circle in 
2 seconds, the length, 2seconds, delimits the STP: John's drawing finished at the STP 
and did not continue, unless he drew another circle (but this new event is not the same 
as the previous one). 
(6d) tests whether a situation is homogeneous, and homogeneity is defined as 'any 
part of the process is of the same nature as the whole' (Vendler 1974: 220). Activities 
and states are homogeneous; accomplishments and achievements are not. Following 
Vendler's explanation (ibid.), if John wrote a letter in an hour, it is not true that John 
wrote the letter in the first quarter of that hour. Conversely, if John wrote for an hour, 
it is true that John wrote! was writing in the first quarter of that hour. The predicate 
'write a letter' is thus not homogeneous; hence accomplishments. Homogeneity 
applies to states as well. If it is true that John loved Mary for the last ten years, it is 
also true that, theoretically, at any point within the last ten years, John loves Mary. 
The answer for (6c) reflects punctual situations, and Vendler distinguishes states and 
achievements in terms of duration. Achievements are punctual, whereas states can last 
for a period of time (p. 221). Because of this, in Vendler's system, achievements lack 
successive internal processes; they happen instantaneously and (6d) does not apply. 
As for Vendler's example 'reach the top at noon sharp' (ibid.), it is false that one 
reached the top at any time before noon sharp. 
18 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
We can see that Vendler uses three criteria: (i) continuous tense criterion for 
distinguishing states and non-states, (ii) STP and homogeneity criteria for 
distinguishing activities from accomplishments in non-states, and (iii) punctuality 
criterion for distinguishing states from achievements in states. This can be seen in (7). 
(7) Vendler's categorization 
continuous tense 
+ duration - duration + STP 
~---~----~-f-~----~ --------------------~ 
achievementsstates 
events 
+ continuous tense 
What (7) fails to capture is the homogeneity criterion. As noted, homogeneity as a 
verbal property pertains to states and activities. Vendler could have classified states 
and activities under the same genus, but why not? If Vendler did that, I think, he 
would contradict himself by setting up the continuous tense criterion. This is the first 
problem I found, by which I am motivated to find out more about the discussions on 
states, processes and events in the literature. Herweg (1991), for instance, classifies 
states and activities under global states, due to the homogeneity criterion. Another 
instance, Mourelatos (1981) diverges from Vendler's by classifying activities, 
accomplishments and achievements under global events. So, although linguists in 
aspectology generally accept Vendler's terminology, not all linguists agree with 
Vendler's paradigm. Disputes occur, especially concerning the 'correct' status of 
activities. In the following subsections, I will focus on various linguists' distinctions 
between global states and events, and the struggle to classify activities. 
19 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
2.1.2 Comrie 
Comrie (1976: 41 - 51) distinguishes between the following: punctual and durative 
situations, telic and atelic situations, and state and dynamic situations. Concerning the 
punctual and durative distinctions, Comrie is explicit in that 'punctual situations do 
not have any duration, not even duration of a very short period' and 'thus a punctual 
situation ... has no internal structure' (1976: 42). Comrie's punctual situations are not 
very different from Vendler's achievements, except that Comrie coins a new category, 
called 'semelfactives' (ibid.), for punctual and atelic situations. Comrie's example 
'cough' is a semelfactive in that its happening is punctual yet does not result from any 
change of state (atelic). 
Concerning the telic and atelic distinctions, telic situations have a 'process that leads 
up to a well-defined terminal point, beyond which the process cannot continue' (p. 45), 
while atelic situations do not have such a property. Comrie's 'well-defined terminal 
point', I think, is identical to Vendler's STP and Smith's 'natural final point' (1991: 
29). Comrie (1976: 45 - 46) already indicates that telic situations are compositional: 
'situations are not described by verbs alone, but rather by the verb together with its 
arguments' (p. 45). His contrast between John is singing (atelic) and John is singing a 
song (telic) shows that the presence of a verb's argument will affect its telicity. In this 
case, the argument 'a song' provides a well-defined terminal point, so at the last note 
of the song, John's singing will stop and not continue. The most interesting 
perspective in Comrie's discussion of telic-atelic distinctions is the statement that, 
from his Russian examples, 'a perfective form referring to a telic situation implies 
attainment of the terminal point of that situation' (p. 46). In other words, if a telic 
predicate is modified by perfective viewpoint aspect (PVA), for instance, wrote a 
20 

Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
poem, it means that the poem is not an unfinished object (i.e. it has been written up). 
Comrie's result from combining telicity and PYA generally accords with Bohnemeyer 
and Swift's default aspect (2004). Bohnemeyer and Swift's cross-linguistic data show 
that by default, telic predicates select PYA and atelic predicates select IVA in 
language. 
Comrie's third distinction, state-dynamic situations, can be distinguished in terms of 
dynamicity. A situation is dynamic, i.e., will continue 'if it is continually subject to a 
new input of energy' (p. 49), while a situation is static if, 'unless something happens 
to change that state, then the state will continue' (ibid.). Comrie seems to indicate that 
states remain unchanged unless an external force changes them, and dynamic 
situations will not cease if there is an input of energy from the Agent argument. 
Comrie's states correspond to Vendler's states, his dynamic situations to Vendler's 
accomplishments and achievements (or global events in our terminology), but he 
differs from Vendler in the nature of processes. Comrie classifies activities such as 
run under dynamic situations, but he differentiates processes and events from the 
point that 'process means a dynamic situation viewed imperfectively, and the term 
'event' means a dynamic situation viewed perfectively' (1976: 51). It thus seems to 
me that Comrie's processes and events differ only in terms of viewpoint aspect. We 
need to reconsider whether distinguishing processes and events in this way is 
appropriate. 
Prior to his discussion of the triple distinctions in his book, Comrie discriminated 
between perfective and imperfective (1976: 16 40). Since dynamic situations consist 
of 'successive phases following one another' in Vendler's sense (1974: 219), these 
phases are what Comrie terms as 'internal tempoml constituency' (1976: 3). A 
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situation can have a beginning, middle and an end stage in its temporal development. 
Comrie is precise in defining perfective as 'without reference to its [a situation's] 
internal temporal constituency: the whole of the situation is presented as a single 
unanalysable whole' (ibid.). Conversely, following Comrie, imperfective can be 
defined with reference to a situation's internal constituency, such that only a stage of 
a situation is highlighted. Comrie's definition of perfective and imperfective are is not 
problematic. Nevertheless, according to his definition ofevents and processes above, I 
found it problematic that events and processes are both dynamic but only viewed 
differently. This sound like processes and events refer to the same situation, and when 
the entire situation is viewed, it is an event; otherwise, it is a process. Swim, for 
instance, behaves differently under PYA and IVA. Under PYA, as in John swam to the 
shore, following Comrie, John's swimming is telic due to the well-defined STP (the 
shore). Under IVA, as in John swam in the sea, John's swimming is atelie due to the 
lack of the STP. John could swim in the sea for as many hours as he wants to. Also, 
when viewed as IVA, it could mean 'John was swimming in the sea' as well. Would 
the former swim in PYA and the latter in IVA refer to the same dynamic situation? 
We have seen that activities and accomplishments are distinguished according to 
Vendler's STP criterion. In our 'swim' example above, the former is telic and can be 
considered as an accomplishment, while the latter is atelic and can be considered as 
an activity. Judging from Vendler's STP criterion, it is not appropriate to classify 
activities and accomplishments under the same group. This is why I found Comrie's 
connections between processes and events problematic. Smith (1991: 5) distinguishes 
between lexical aspect from viewpoint aspect: whereas situation types (i.e. Vendler's 
quadripartition) formed by non-temporal factors such as verbs and their argument 
structure fall into the domain of lexical aspect, PYA and IVA realized by aspectual 
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morphemes are relevant to time and fall into the domain of viewpoint aspect. 
According to Smith, although situation type and viewpoint co-occur, 'the two types of 
information are independent' (ibid.). One could follow Smith and argue that viewpoint 
aspect alone cannot determine situation types. On the other hand, even though it is 
true that processes and events are both dynamic, it is not true that they are necessarily 
the same dynamic situation. 
I summarize Comrie's categorization in (8). 
(8) Comrie's categorization 
I 
I 
I 
I 
situations 
static dynamic imperfective 1 perfective 
states processes I events 
2.1.3 Mourelatos 
Mourelatos's situations (1981: 20 I) comprise states and occurrences. occurrences 
comprise processes and events, and events comprise developments and punctual 
occurrences. Mourelatos's states and occurrences are our global states and global 
events. Mourelatos classifies processes (activities) and events (accomplishments and 
achievements) under the global events. Mourelatos thus resembles Comrie in that he 
treats processes and events under global events (though they differ in details) and 
differs from Vendler in that he does not classify states and achievements under 
global states. Mourelatos' categorization is represented in (9). The term, 
'performances', in this table originates from from Kenny (1963). Kenny (1963: 174­
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179; 182 - 186) cited in Mourelatos (1981: 194) argues for triple partition - states, 
processes and performances. Mourelatos seems to follow Kenny's system and adopt 
the view that accomplishments always contain achievements as their outcome. 'What 
argues strongly for the integration of accomplishments and achievements is that both 
are actions that involve a product, upshot, or outcome' (Mourelatos 1981: 193). This 
view holds that accomplishments and achievements have outcome in their own 
structure. IS In other words, accomplishments and achievements are intrinsically telic. 
Here we see the first example ofhow telicity is applied in situation classifications. 
(9) Mourelatos' categorization 
Situations 
States occurrences (actions) 
Processes I Events (performances) 
I developments I punctual occurrences 
Another interesting perspective in Mourelatos (1981) is the established correlation 
between the mass-count properties in the nominal domain and the states-events 
distinctions in the verbal domain. Mourelatos coined two terms, 'mass-quantified' and 
'count-quantified' (1981: 202) to describe the correlation. States and mass nouns are 
mass-quantified, and events resemble count nouns. 
To test whether a predicate is count-quantified or mass-quantified, Mourelatos 
nominalizes verbal predicates (p. 204). This strategy is useful, I think. We cannot 
directly compare the properties of nouns and verbs, as they are two different domains. 
By applying Mourelatos' strategy, the gap is shortened, as now the nominal 
15 This view is echoed in Moens and Steedman's event nucleus (1988: 15), where achievements 
can be considered as punctual outcomes and accomplishments as a developmental processes followed 
by a punctual outcome (p. 15 18). 
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equivalents of verbs can be directly compared with nouns in the same domain. The 
nominalization equivalents either refer to the gerundive form (e.g. wash - washing) or 
the derivative form (e.g. develop development). The following instances are 
Mourelatos's original examples: 
(10) (a) states: John hates liars. 

*There is a hating by John of liars. (p. 208) 

(b) processes: John pushed the cart for hours. 
(OK) For hours there was (a) pushing of the cart by John. (p. 206)? 
(c) events: Mary capsized the boat. 

(OK) There was a capsizing of the boat by Mary. (p. 204) 

Examples in (10) show that different grammatical constraints apply to different types 
of nominalized predicates. The nominalization in (lOa) admits neither the indefinite 
article nor the gerundive form. In (lOb), only the gerundive form but not the indefinite 
article is admissible. In (lOc), both the indefinite article and the gerundive form are 
allowed. States fail the first circumstance and thus resemble mass nouns in their 
grammatical constraints. The admission of an indefinite article is not grammatical 
before a Mass noun. Events pass the third circumstance and resemble count nouns in 
that the admission of an indefinite article shows that they are count. Processes, 
however, is a difficult case to determine. Processes satisfy the second circumstance, 
so they can undergo gerundive nominalization but do not admit the indefinite article. 
This would need a special explanation. 
Following Mourelatos's explanations (p. 204 - 210), processes resemble states in 
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terms of homogeneity, but they can be distinguished in terms of individualizability. 
Mass nouns, for instance, water and paper, are homogeneous in their part-whole 
structure: if X is gold, then all parts ofX are gold (p. 210). States in verbal domain are 
like this, and they cannot be qualified by count adverbials (p. 205). For instance, the 
count adverbial 'two times' is not appropriate in John hates liars two times. Likewise, 
according to Mourelatos, John pushed the cart three times sounds odd but if more 
contexts are added, for instance, John pushed the cart over the hill three times, it is 
acceptable (p. 207). As for (lOc), Mary capsized the boat two times is fairly 
acceptable. So, processes differ from states in that they could be quantified (given the 
appropriate context), but events are intrinsically quantified. From my understanding 
of Mourelatos's mass-quantified and count-quantified predicates, Mourelatos 
indicates that states are like mass nouns, processes are like quantized mass nouns (e.g. 
a cup of water; two pieces of paper), while events are like count nouns. 
Nevertheless, Mourelatos's inclusion of processes and events under the same global 
category is problematic. As Mourelatos also makes use of the homogeneity criterion, 
he could have classified processes and states under the same global category, and why 
not? Though processes are countable mass-quantified predicates, homogeneity 
criterion is still applicable here and sufficient to distinguish states from non-states. 
Our discussions from Vendler to Mourelatos show one thing: to which global category 
processes belong is a hard case to determine, especially concerning the dilemma 
between homogeneity criterion (processes as states), telicity criterion (processes as 
states), countability criterion (processes as events) and dynamicity criterion (processes 
as events). 
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2.1.4 Parsons 
Like all the previous authors, Parsons maintained the importance of distinguishing 
states and events. 'For many purposes the distinctions among eventualities [situations] 
will not be important', Parsons maintains, 'but for a few purposes certain differences 
win be crucial- that between events and states being most important' (1994: 20). The 
most important purpose for such distinctions is that states hold and events culminate. 
Parsons's notation 'CuI (e, t)' means that an event e culminates at time t, while his 
notation of 'Hold (e, t)' means that an event e holds at time t. 
Somewhat contradictorily, from my reading, Parsons (1994) seems to say that not all 
events necessarily culminate. This is evident from the following quote: 'I do not 
suppose that every event has a culmination' (p. 24), and Parsons explains further by 
hypothesizing a circumstance as follows, 'If Mary begins building a bookcase but is 
struck by lighting when she has finished three-quarters of the work, then there is an 
event that is a building, that has her for a subject, that has a bookcase (an unfinished 
one) as object, and that never culminates' (ibid.). 
Following Parsons' analogy, if something unexpectedly happens to the Agent and 
interrupts the action, the action is not completely done; therefore a non-culminated 
situation. Even though 'build' is a canonical accomplishment verb and has a STP in 
Vendler's sense, the situation (in this case, building a bookcase) does not necessarily 
culminate. Parsons emphasizes on this point and says that it is important to 
understand his solutions to Dowty's Imperfective Paradox (1977; 1979). We will see 
how he has solved the Paradox later. At this stage, it is sufficient to note that Parsons 
correlates processes and the progressive (1994: 182 - 185) and that Parsons' processes 
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are defined as events - not the maximal events but actually 'a series or amalgam of 
events' (1994: 184). His own example 'walk', for instance, 'is a bunch of overlapping 
walking events - small ones, large ones, and so on' (ibid.) and she treats 'process 
verbs as a special kind of event verb' (ibid.). Therefore, in this paradigm, processes 
and event verbs culminate, while only state verbs hold. 
Could Parsons's implication that processes are events but just a special kind of event 
verbs be true? Following his definition of processes as an amalgam of events, 
concerning his example 'walk', there must a total walking event that consists of many 
movements, and these movements are conceptualized as processes. Leading from this, 
processes and events in Parsons' paradigm seem to have a part-whole structure, but 
crucially, this does not serve as a salient, powerful property that can theoretically 
distinguish processes and events. Moreover, I can't agree with his opinion that 
processes also culminate. I will continue to discuss the problem concerning Parsons' 
culminated processes when turning to solve Dowty's Imperfective Paradox. 
2.1.5 Moens and Steedman 
Like Parsons, Moens and Steedman (1988: 16) use the term 'culmination' in their 
event nucleus, but unlike Parsons, they do not distinguish predicates that culminate 
and those that hold. Parsons' 'CuI (e, t)' and 'Hold (e, t)' are sentence operators, His 
'CuI (e, t)' means that the entire event described by an exemplified sentence, say, 
'Mary built a bookcase', culminates at time t, if there are no unfinished objects left at 
that time t. As for the event described by 'Mary was building a bookcase', at time t 
when this is true, it is not true that the bookcase gets built at that time t (p. 24; 171). In 
this case, Parsons uses the operator Hold (e, t). In Moens and Steedman's paradigm, 
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they use 'event nucleus' to represent a culminated situation (1988: 18), as in (11). 
Moens and Steedman define this event nucleus as 'as an association of a goal event, 
or "culmination", with a "preparatory process" by which it is accomplished, and a 
"consequent state", which ensures' (1988: 15). Their goal event is equivalent to our 
telic event, or global events in this dissertation. 
(11) Moens and Steedman's event nucleus (1988: 18) 
A B 
culmination 
Something overlaps between Parsons' account for accomplishments and Moens and 
Steedman's event nucleus of a goal event: the preparatory process. As also identified 
by Parsons, 'an event often has both a developmental portion and a culmination' 
(1994: 23 24). But Parsons does not include the consequent state phrase in his 
analysis of culminated events. For Moens and Steedman, the consequent state phrase 
is always present if a process culminates. 
According to Moens and Steedman's categorization (1988: 15 - 17), events that have 
a consequent state are called 'culminated process', which is equivalent to Vendler's 
accomplishments. Events that culminate and 'last' instantaneously are called 
'culmination', which is equivalent to Vendler's achievements. Situations that have 
preparatory process only are process, which is equivalent to Vendler's activities. 
Besides, situations that have culmination, but do not have a consequent state, are 
called 'points', which is equivalent to Comrie's punctual, dynamic situations or 
'semelfactives' (1981: 42). Semelfactives are punctual situations, e.g. cough, that 
29 

Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
can take place once or repeatedly. In Smith (1991), they are treated as dynamic, 
punctual and atelic (p. 30), so semelfactives are different from processes only in terms 
ofduration. 
Moens and Steedman talk about how the use of progressive shifts the aspectua1 
interpretation by coercion (1988: 18 19). 'If a progressive combines with a 
culminated process, as in "Roger was running a mile'" then the latter must also first 
be coerced to become a process' (1988: 18). When coercion happens, only the 
preparatory process is retained; culmination is 'stripped off' (ibid.). 'It is no longer 
asserted that the culminations in question ever in fact occurred, but only that the 
associated preparatory processes did' (Moens and Steedman 1988: 19). In other words, 
by the use of progressive, a telic accomplishment can be coerced to an atelic process, 
and an atelic process never culminates. The consequence of this is that a telic event 
modified by progressive does not produce any consequent state that ensures its 
successful happening. Their examples: 
(12) (a) Harry was running a mile, but he gave up after two laps. 
(b) Harry was reaching the top when he slipped and fell to the bottom. 
(1988: 19) 
Putting these two examples in Moens and Steedman's event nucleus, the culmination 
and part B are stripped off and only part A is retained. We can explain why coercion 
occurs by the usage of PYA and IYA (cf. Comrie 1976). The YP 'run a mile' is an 
accomplishment, and 'reach the top' is an achievement. Since a situation modified by 
PYA is viewed as a complete entirety (Comrie 1976), accomplishments and 
achievements modified by PYA must culminate and produce a resultant state (i.e. a 
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mile is run, and the top is reached). On the other hand, situations described by IVA 
(e.g. progressive) do not culminate, so Harry never finished running a mile in (9a) and 
did not reach the top in (9b). Moens and Steedman's aspectual coercion could be a 
solution to Dowty's Imperfective Paradox, so I will postpone the discussion until 
2.2.2. 
In the next two subsections, we will see two opposing approaches to the proper 
categorization of processes. Herweg argues that only discrete situations are events, 
whereas Smith argues that only dynamic situations are events. Discrete situations are 
quantized situations, and dynamic situations refer to situations that take time to 
develop. According to Herweg, processes are non-discrete situations; hence 
homogeneous and a subcategory of states. On the other hand, according to Smith, 
processes are dynamic as they take time to develop; hence a subcategory of events. 
After introducing Herweg and Smith in 2.1.6 and 2.1.7 respectively, I will make a 
short conclusion in 2.1.8. 
2.1.6 Herweg 
Herweg (1991) is a mereological approach to the distinctions between global states 
and events on the one hand, and those between imperfectives and perfectives, on the 
other. The term 'mereological approach' can be defined as 'the theory of parthood 
relations: of the relations of part to whole and the relations of part to part within a 
whole' (Standford Encyclopedia of Phllosophy) 16. Since mereological approach deals 
with part-whole relations, the properties held between parts and whole of a situation 
16 This is from Stanford's online resources. Path: http://plato.stanford.edulentries/mereology/ 
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are thus the most important criterion of Herweg. Here is my summary of Herweg's 
distinctions between global states and events (1991). 
Firstly, similarly to Mourelatos, Herweg (1991: 969 970) notes that events are 
countable as they can be modified by count temporal adverbials (e.g. twice, three 
times ... etc.). As his example (13a) shows, Herweg uses frequency adverbials and 
Mourelatos uses cardinal count adverbials l7 to prove this. Similarly to Dowty's 'in a 
time'test, Herweg's example in (l3c), but not (12b), passes the test. Predicates that 
admit frequency adverbials are countable and those that admit frame temporal 
adverbials (Dowty's in-a-time test) have a 'definite time of occurrence', borrowing 
from Vendler (1967) cited in Herweg (1991: 970). Events possess these properties. 
Since events are countable, they can be considered as 'abstract individuals from a 
logical point of view' (ibid.). According to Herweg (1991: 971), the part -whole 
relations held in events are this: 'only the entity as a whole, but none of its parts, 
satisfies the predicate which is responsible for its logical status'. This means that 
events are themselves individuals that cannot be further decomposed to discrete 
subparts that are also the same individuals. Herweg's example in (13c) is an event. 
Following Herweg's characterization above, during the time period (this morning, say 
between 6am to 12am), if Peter rode his bike to the seaside twice during any segment 
of the entire period (say between 6am to 8am as one segment; 9am to llam as 
another), Peter rode his bike to the seaside four times that morning, not twice. This 
results in contradictions to the truth-value of (13a). Therefore, it is clear that the 
part-whole relations of events, from this example, show that events are heterogeneous. 
Herweg also extend his part~whole analysis of events to that of count nouns. Events 
17 Please note that Herweg's frequency adverbials are equivalent to Mourelatos' cardinal count 
adverbials (twice, three times ... etc.), whereas Mourelatos' frequency adverbials (often, always ... etc.) 
are not identical to Herweg's. 
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and count nouns, from the mereological perspectives, are structurally heterogeneous. 
The heterogeneity property of events can also explain Dowty's in-a-time admission: 
events are 'temporally bounded' (ibid.). 
(13) (a) Peter rode his bike to the seaside twice this morning. (ex. la) 
(b) * Peter stood on the beach twice this morning 18. 	 (ex.2a) 
(c) Peter rode his bike to the seaside in two hours this morning. (ex. Ic) 
(d) * Peter stood on the beach in two hours this morning. (ex.2c) 
(e) Peter stood on the beach for two hours this morning. (ex.2b) 
(Herweg 1991: 970) 
The part-whole relations of states, on the other hand, are homogeneous, for they 
satisfy two principles: distributivity and cumulativity. Their definition is restated 
below: 
(14) 	 Distributivity means that the application of the predicate is passed on from an 
entity to its parts, that is, the predicate is closed with respect to the part-of 
relation between the entities in its extension: if such a predicate applies to an 
entity, it applies to its parts as well. (p. 971) 
(15) 	 Cumulativity means that the application of the predicate is passed on from the 
parts to the whole: if two entities satisfy a cumulative predicate, they may be 
combined into a more complex entity which again satisfies the predicate. 
(ibid.) 
18 Note that Herweg later modifies this sentence with an addition of a temporal duration, and his 
'Peter stood on the beach for two hours twice this morning' becomes acceptable (1991: 976). Herweg 
explains this by the principle of quantization. 'This morning' describes a vague period of time, but 'two 
hours' does not. Herweg says that the usage of 'two hours' in relation to 'this morning' is like a time 
phase (or stretch). I understand this as we compare the mass noun water and its countable counterpart a 
cup ofwater in the nominal domain. The relationShip between 'two hours' and 'this morning' in the 
verbal domain is identical to that between 'a cup of water' and 'water' in the nominal domain. 
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Applying Herweg's distributivity and cumulativity: John ran from 3pm to 5pm this 
afternoon is a state. This sentence meets Herweg's criteria of distributivity in that we 
can have segments of John's running, say, between 3pm to 3:30pm and 4pm to 5pm. 
If John ran from 3pm to 5pm is true, then John ran from 3pm to 3:30pm and John ran 
from 4pm to 5pm are also true l9 [but with different implications]. Here we see that 
the part-whole relations are identical: if the relation held between x and y is z, the 
relation held between x and y's subparts YI, Y2. Y3 ...etc. are also z. Any temporal 
subinterval within the period between 3pm and 5pm is identical to John's running 
throughout the entire time stretch. On the other hand, between John's running from 
2:30pm to 5pm and John's running from 3:30pm to 5pm, there is an overlapping 
period, that is, between 2:30pm and 3:30pm, which is, again, not different from any 
temporal segment and from the entirety of John's running. The period between 2:30 
and 3:30 and its neighbouring periods constitute the same kind of running, which 
meets Herweg's criterion of cumulativity. In short, states are homogeneous predicates 
due to the distributive and cumulative relationships between the internal structure and 
the entirety. As a consequence of this, states can be discriminated from events, from 
the perspectives of their homogeneouslheterogeneous part-whole relations. This is the 
main claim Herweg holds, crucially important to his classifying states from events. 
Secondly, states are temporally unbounded, while events are temporally bounded 
(Herweg 1991: 970 - 971). 'states are considered to be temporally unbounded, that is, 
the existence of temporal bounds - if there are any is out of focus; this prevents 
states from being located within a time span' (p. 970). Earlier we have seen that 
19 My examples here are two temporal segments, two subevents of John's running from 3pm to 
5pm. Ifit is true that John did run from 3pm to 5pm, John did run from 3pm to 3:30pm (as one segment) 
and from 4pm to 5pm (as another segment). What I want to clarify here is that the internal structure of 
these two segments is homogeneous to that of the whole. 
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events are countable, possess a definite temporal occurrence, and are temporally 
bounded. States are defined conversely: mass, an indefinite temporal occurrence and 
temporally unbounded. All these properties can be associated with the choice of 
viewpoint aspect. From Comrie (1976), we see that PVA is defined as 'all parts of the 
situation are presented as a single whole' (p. 18), while IVA as 'explicit reference to 
the internal temporal structure of a situation' (p. 24). States and IVA are connected due 
to the temporal unboundness of states and IVA focus on the homogeneous internal 
structure. Events and PVA are connected, due to the temporal boundness of events and 
PVA focus on the heterogeneous internal structure as an entirety. 
Coming back to the categorization of processes: one striking fact is that Herweg does 
not distinguish processes from states. States and processes are 'instances of the global 
conceptual category of states' (1991: 984). Similarly to states, processes meet the 
criteria of cumulativity and distributivity. However, as Herweg also notes. the 
challenge of this view comes from Dowty (1986: 42) cited in Herweg (1991: 984). 
Dowty's example 'waltz' requires the dancer to dance in a fixed manner in order to 
start waltzing. Dowty points out that in his 'waltz' example, the first steps cannot be 
called 'waltz'; therefore the initial stage and the rest of the internal structure are not 
homogeneous. Processes, in Dowty's analogy of waltz, are homogeneous 'down to a 
certain limit in size' (1986: 42). This is sharply different from states, whose 
homogeneity is down to any point. Herweg ignores the initial heterogeneity of 
processes of any kind, because 'on the assumption that the semantic theory of the 
aspects has to deal with conceptual categorizations of situations rather than properties 
of factual situations' (Herweg 1991: 985). Fine, but I would argue that Herweg could 
have challenged Dowty on two points. The first point holds that either down to points 
or down to parts, however trivial, homogeneity is the same property pertaining to 
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states and processes. The second point comes from my reading of Kiparsky (1998). 
Kiparsky is right that we can put the so-called minimum part problem aside, because 
we cannot divide a process homogeneously ad infinitum (Kiparsky 1998io. From 
these two points, Herweg is right that processes can be classified as a subcategory of 
states in terms of their mass property, homogeneity and compatibility with IVA. 
We have seen Vendler (1974), Comrie (1976), Mourelatos (1981), Parsons (1994), 
Moens and Steedman (1988). It follows that none of these authors would support that 
processes should be classified as a subcategory of global states. Herweg's decision 
from the mereological perspectives, in my opinion, is unique. In the next subsection, 
we will see Smith's defence for classifying processes as a subcategory of events. 
2.1.7 Smith 
Smith (1991: 29) defined events as 'dynamic, involving agency, activity and change', 
and states as 'a period of undifferentiated moments, without endpoints' (p. 28). Taylor 
(1977: 206) cited in Smith (1991) points out that 'states are in time but they do not 
take time' (1977: 206). In contrast, events need to take time to develop. The property 
[+stages] is crucial in Smith's paradigm (1991: 30). If a situation has the property 
[+stages], it takes time to develop; otherwise, the situation has [-stages]. Among 
Smith's five categories21 , only states have the property [-stages]. This is where global 
states and events are differentiated. Due to [+stages], if a dynamic situation need to 
reach the last stage, it requires 'input of energy' (Comrie 1976: 49) to carry on. This is 
20 Kiparsky's paper is originally published in Miriam Butt and Wihelm Geuder (eds.) (1998). The 
version I have is downloaded from Stanford's website, footnote 13. See # 1 in Internet Bibliography. 
21 Smith's five categories are states, activity, accomplishment, semelfactive and achievement 
(1991: 30). 
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states and processes. The second point comes from my reading of Kiparsky (1998). 
Kiparsky is right that we can put the so-called minimum part problem aside, because 
we cannot divide a process homogeneously ad infinitum (Kiparsky 1998)20. From 
these two points, Herweg is right that processes can be classified as a subcategory of 
states in terms of their mass property, homogeneity and compatibility with IVA. 
We have seen Vendler (1974), Comrie (1976), Mourelatos (1981), Parsons (1994), 
Moens and Steedman (1988). It follows that none of these authors would support that 
processes should be classified as a subcategory of global states. Herweg's decision 
from the mereological perspectives, in my opinion, is unique. In the next subsection, 
we will see Smith's defence for classifying processes as a subcategory of events. 
2.1.7 Smith 
Smith (1991: 29) defined events as 'dynamic, involving agency, activity and change', 
and states as 'a period of undifferentiated moments, without endpoints' (p. 28). Taylor 
(1977: 206) cited in Smith (1991) points out that 'states are in time but they do not 
take time' (1977: 206). In contrast, events need to take time to develop. The property 
[+stages] is crucial in Smith's paradigm (1991: 30). If a situation has the property 
[+stages], it takes time to develop; otherwise, the situation has [-stages]. Among 
Smith's five categories2l , only states have the property [-stages]. This is where global 
states and events are differentiated. Due to [+stages], if a dynamic situation need to 
reach the last stage, it requires 'input of energy' (Comrie 1976: 49) to carry on. This is 
20 Kiparsky's paper is originally published in Miriam Butt and Wihelm Geuder (eds.) (1998). The 
version I have is downloaded from Stanford's website, footnote 13. See # I in Intemet Bibliography. 
21 Smith's five categories are states, activity, accomplishment, semelfactive and achievement 
(1991: 30). 
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clear from her paper (1999), where Smith advances to guard that processes are events, 
by following Comrie's definition of dynamic situations: 'events are continually 
subject to a new input of energy' (Comrie 1976: 49) cited in Smith (1999: 486). 
Smith comments on Herweg's mereological approach in the last subsection as a 
'strong mereological view' (1999: 485) and she obviously disagrees with Herweg's in 
that she sees processes as situations 'with explicit temporal bounds', being 'discrete, 
with non-unifonn part structures' (1999: 484). This is interesting. Smith seems to 
follow Depraetere (1995) and argue that telicity and boundness are two separate 
issues: 'while telic events have intrinsic bounds, temporally bounded situations have 
bounds which are explicit and independent' (Heinamaki 1984; Depraetere 1995) cited 
in (Smith 1999: 485). In this approach, processes and events are all bounded, but with 
different conditions. Whereas events are intrinsically bounded, processes are 
temporally bounded. What temporal bounds mean is reflected by the use of duration 
adverbials in Smith's examples: Mary worked for 2 hours and Mary slept from 2 to 4 
this afternoon (po 484). Smith indicates that these two examples are activities and they 
'pattern syntactically and semantically with telic sentences' (ibid.). At the footnote 7 
on the same page, Smith explains this further by admitting the bounded adverbials 'in 
a time': Mary played her violin for an hour in 3 hours and It took Mary 3 hours to 
play her violin for an hour (ibid.). Smith's argument is this: if the standard test for 
telicity 'in a time' is compatible with a process like 'x V-ed for y hours', the process 
verb and telic events behaves alike: they are dynamic and bounded, with 
heterogeneous part-whole structures (p. 485). The question concerns us here is thus 
whether processes are temporally bounded, and even if so, whether a temporally 
bounded situation and an intrinsically telic bounded situation can be equivalent. 
Boundness is relevant to the compositionality of telicity, so I will postpone the 
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question till 3.2., where I will discuss Depraetere (1995) particularly. 
At this stage, it is sufficient to note that Smith differs from Herweg in terms of 
temporal dynamism. Now the problem concerning the classification of processes 
becomes clear. On the one hand, as Herweg notes, structural distributivity and 
cumulativity are an overlapping property that both states and processes obtain. On the 
other hand, as Smith notes, temporal dynamism is an overlapping property both 
processes and events share. If one does not want to argue for one or the other, what 
would one do? I will provide a simple solution in the next subsection. 
2.1.8 A short conclusion 
The different categorizations of above-mentioned authors can be summarized as in 
(16) below. In this table, I exclude semelfactives, because I want to concentrate on the 
contrast between Vendler's original fourfold categories. As noted, semelfactives are 
punctual processes, so they should be categorized under processes. For example, if we 
want to categorize semelfactives under Mourelatos' paradigm, we can categorize them 
as a subcategory of processes and use [±duration] to distinguish them. Since 
Mourelatos classifies processes under the global events, so are the semelfactives. 
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(16) A summary of categorization 
Vendler 
Comrie 
Mourelatos 
Parsons 
Moens &Steedman r-----~-~~------+-~------~--~~----~~~---------
Herweg 
Smith 
~~~~~~~----------r----~~~~~~~-------
(conseq.: consequent state) 
(17) The ambiguous position of processes in the categorization 
+ homogeneous 1 - homogeneous 
states l processes? 1 events 
- dynamic 1 + dynamic 
22 
' ? culminate' means that it is not certain that a process would culminate. This is Parsons' view. 
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The classification of processes is tricky. On the one hand, from Comrie and Vendler 
processes are atelic yet dynamic. On the other hand, from Mourelatos, processes are 
indivisible yet homogeneous. These conflicts are shown in (17) 2]. Classifying 
processes as a subpart of states (energia) will leave the question of dynamicity 
unsolved. Classifying processes as a subpart of events (kinesis) will leave the problem 
of telicity unanswered. Nonetheless, the status of processes must be clarified in order 
to distinguish further between aspectual classifications. Linguists who classify 
processes as a subcategory of events generally recognize the similarity that both 
processes and events are dynamic but ignore the fact that processes are atelic and 
events are telic. To avoid these, I simply establish processes as a global category, on 
the same footing of states. I am inspired by Pustejovsky's event structure of transition 
(1991). 
The goal of Pustejovsky (1991) is to provide a lexical representation of event 
structure, which includes (i) the primitive event type of the lexical item, (ii) the rules 
of event composition and (iii) the mapping rules of lexical structure (1991: 55). 
Pustejovsky'S basic event types are states, processes and transitions (1991: 56). 
Pustejovsky defines states as 'a single event, which is evaluated relative to no other 
event', process as 'a sequence of events identifying the same semantic expression', 
and events as 'an event identifying a semantic expression, which is evaluated relative 
to its opposition' (ibid.). Pustejovsky'S use of events is equivalent to our situations, 
which could refer to any of Vendler's quadripartition. What inspires me is his level of 
representation of transition, as in (18). Grimshaw (1990:26) adopts this and makes it 
23 Readers may note that this diagram is similar to Verkuyl's (1989: 42; 91). In Verkuyl (1989: 42), 
he focuses on the aspectual properties such as [±ADD TO] and [± SQA]. He found that processes have 
[+ADD TO] and [-SQA]. I have a different intention: I merely want to point out the dilemma of 
classifying processes as either of the global categories. 
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clearer in (19). 
(18) Pustejovsky's transition (1991: 56) 
T[ transition] 
(19) Grimshaw's adoption of Pustejovsky's structure of transition 

(Grimshaw 1990: 26) 

event 
A 
process state 
In (18) and (19), transitions (or our global events) can be decomposed to states and 
processes. Similarly to Moens and Steedman's event nucleus (1988: 18), an event 
consists of a developmental process and a state. Pustejovsky's state, however, is not 
really identical to Moens and Steedman's. His state is always the state opposite to the 
original state before the developmental process takes place. What Pustejovsky's 
transition means is clear: the transition of a situation's original state to its consequent 
state via a developmental process. For instance, in John built a house, the transition 
takes place from the original state (the house is not built) to the consequent state (the 
house is built), via the developmental process (John's building). 
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Pustejovsky does not discuss the polar distinctions between states and non-states; this 
is not his aim. My goal is to suggest that, by showing Pustejovsky's event structure of 
transition and Moens & Steedman's event nucleus, processes are not only the 
developmental processes in events but can be an independent global category. I 
establish processes as an independent category, distinguish them from states in terms 
ofdynamicity and then distinguish them from events in terms of telicity. Processes are 
dynamic; temporal dynamism is involved in the course of processes. Processes are 
atelic: unless other linguistic devices that can express telicity are provided 24, 
processes are always atelic, ongoing in time. I have two motivations for this decision. 
The first motivation is to generalize progressives as processes: dynamic and atelic. 
The second motivation is to account for the amassing amount of VPs that consists 
bare plurals in MC. As we will see that the mass properties of the object arguments 
affect telicity in 3.1 and 3.2, the resulting predicates have the characteristics of our 
processes. Good evidence in MC supports that processes are neither a subcategory of 
states nor of events, but an independent global category. Events in Me are derived by 
either (i) the mass nouns (bare plurals) become quantified by admitting a quantifier 
and a classifier or (ii) the addition of a resultative complement to indicate culmination 
in Moens and Steedman's sense. I will explain this in 3.3. Now, concerning the first 
motivation, it is necessary to apply processes and correlate progressives as processes 
first. 
24 The linguistic devices that compose telicity will become clear in 3.2. 
42 

Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
2.2. Applying processes 
2.2.1 Processes are not absent in achievements 
A topic related to processes in the discussion of events is the question whether we 
should include processes in the event structure of achievements. Smith (1991) refuses 
to include processes in the event structure of achievements. "Although an 
Achievement may allow or even require an associated process'. Smith argues, 'the 
process is not taken as part of the event' (1991: 31). On the other hand, Tenny (1994) 
considers the issue of duration problematic. "The line between an achievement and an 
accomplishment reading of a verbal expression is blurred', Tenny notes, 'whereas the 
distinction between a delimited and non-delimited reading is not' (1994: 16). I support 
Tenny and will give reasons in the following paragraphs. 
From Tenny (1994), we can generalize that authors who exclude processes from 
achievements hold a common view that achievements are punctual - their occurrence 
is too short to include the developmental process. Vendler (1974) and Smith (1991) 
hold the view that the [±duration] feature is a criterion to discriminate momentary and 
durative situations. For them, situations that have developmental processes are 
durative, and those which do not allow them are instantaneous. Their convincing point 
is that durative situation types can accord with the progressives, while the punctual 
ones can't. Also, it makes sense to ask how long a durative situation lasts, but it 
doesn't make sense to ask how long a punctual situation lasts. See the examples of 
these salient features overleaf. 
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(20) (a) * It took John five minutes to win. (achievement) 
(b) It took John five minutes to beat the opponent. ( accomplishment) 
(c) *Mary is winning. (achievement) 
(d) Mary is beating the opponent. ( accomplishment) 
The reason why situations that have developmental processes are durative is that 
progressives require a middle stage that can be highlighted on (cf. Comrie 1976). The 
middle stage is the developmental process in Moens and Steedman's event nucleus, or 
in Pustejovsky's event structure of transition. Vendler's view 0974: 221) holds that 
the incompatibility with the progressive in (20c) shows that achievements are just 'a 
single moment' (ibid.). I would argue that (20c) is not ungrammatical. (20c) means 
that Mary is about to win but has not won yet. For instance in a racing game, (20c) 
does make sense if Mary is at the last lap while all the opponents are lagging far 
behind. So, there is nothing wrong in combing a progressive and an achievement verb. 
Actually doing so strengthens the presence of a developmental process: the usage of 
the progressives is evident for the presence of processes; otherwise, where could the 
progressive highlight on? Achievements, therefore, are not just'a single moment'. If 
Mary is about to win at her last lap, the last lap is a part of the developmental process. 
The developmental process must exist to satisfy the truth-value of (20c) in semantics. 
From here, we can see that the use of PYA and IVA shifts the highlight. If an 
achievement is modified by PYA (Mary won), it is a completed and culminated event. 
PYA highlights on the consequent state (Mary has won). If it is modified by IVA as in 
(20c), the progressive highlights on the developmental process and the resultant phase 
is thus out of focus. Following the train of this thought, the modification of the 
progressives does not weaken, but strengthens, the inclusion of a developmental 
process in achievements. 
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Tenny is correct that both accomplishments and achievements are 'delimited events' 
(1994: 17), because they are both telic and culminate. Duration is a matter of time, 
and it does not affect whether an achievement is telic or not. How short a process 
must be in order not to be existent is hard to determine. Since accomplishments and 
achievements must all culminate, despite the duration, they should be treated 
conceptually alike. On the other hand, I think one cannot also say that the 
developmental process is omitted in achievements. Following Hale & Keyser (1994) 
and Chomsky (1995), I assume that accomplishments and achievements have an 
identical syntactical representation. Despite the length of their duration and the 
consequent sensitivity to the adverbial modification of time, accomplishments do not 
differ from achievements in structure. They can be represented by VP shells. 
Canonical accomplishments such as break and build are two-place predicates with the 
external AGENT argument originating within the outer vp (Spec, vp) shell while the 
internal THEME argument originates within the inner VP (Spec, VP). The external 
AGENT argument initiates the developmental process and the internal THEME 
argument is subsequently affected by the process. Following Hay and Keyser (1993: 
83 93), the outer vp shell is causative and the inner VP is inchoative. The outer 
representation is actually a process, and the inner representation is a state. 
Accomplishments and achievements have both outer and inner representations, while 
speakers can choose between viewpoint aspects to either focus on the developmental 
process (progressives), or on the resultant phase (perfect), or both the process and the 
resultant stage (perfective). 
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2.2.2 Reanalyzing Dowty's Imperfective Paradox 
Recall Parsons' discussion on processes in 2.1.5. In her paradigm, a process is 
'actually a series or amalgam of events' (1994: 184). Because of this, Parsons' 
example of processes, Mary ran, also culminates25 • But its progressive form, Mary 
was running, does not culminate but 'hold' (ibid.). When a progressive holds, it does 
not culminate and produce a result. Parsons uses this to avoid the imperfective 
paradox (p. 185). What is the imperfective paradox? 
Dowty's imperfective paradox (1977) emerges when the following examples are 
contrasted: 
(21) (a) John was drawing a circle. 
(b) John drew a circle. 
(22) (a) John was pushing a cart. 
(b) John pushed a cart. 

(original examples from Dowty (1977: 45) ex. 1 - 4) 

Dowty is correct that 'drew a circle' in (21) is an accomplishment; 'pushed a cart' in 
(22) is a process. This is one of the readings of an ambiguous sentence. When (2lb) 
and (22b) are modified by progressives, we respectively obtain (2la) and (22a), but 
with different entailments. Whereas (22a) entails (22b), (21 a) does not entail (21 b). 
(22) shows that as long as John started pushing a cart, he pushed the cart. By contrast, 
2S (3t)[t < now & (3 e)[running (e) & Subject (e, Mary) & Cui (e, tm (Parsons 1994: 184) 
Running is an event, whose subject is Mary and it culminates before the present moment. 
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(21b) entails that the whole circle must now exist, while (21a) asserts that only a part 
of the circle exists. The serious question is whether the whole circle in (21a) will 
eventually exist. 
Dowty's answer is yes not in the actual world - but in the possible worlds known as 
'inertia worlds' (1979). 'Inertia worlds are to be thought of as worlds which are 
exactly like the given world up to the time in question and in which the future course 
of events after this time develops in ways most compatible with the past course of 
events' (1979: 208). Parsons comments that this idea is that 'the progressive sentence 
is true just in case the nonprogressive version would have been true in any situation 
like this one that proceeded normally' (1994: 169). Accordingly, that 'John drew a 
circle' is true in the actual world entails that 'John was drawing a circle' is true in the 
inertia worlds, where John's circle must come to existence eventually (ibid.). 
A major motivation for Dowty's insistence that unfinished objects in progressive 
sentences must all eventually exist in the inertia worlds, I think, is to satisfy the 
definition of his accomplishments: [<p CAUSE [BECOME \j1]]26 (1977: 47). Dowty 
(1977: 47) defines it as follows: 'here <p and \j1 are sentences. CAUSE is a two-place 
sentential connective, and BECOME a one-place tense operator'. Take'John drew a 
circle' for example again. John draws a circle is <p and the circle exists is \j1. <p causes 
\j1 to change. Next, Dowty shows that 'John was drawing a circle' as [PROG [<p 
CAUSE [BECOME '1']]]. In this case, the object 'circle' must theoretically exist in 
order to satisfy [BECOME '1'], since this proposition must have its participant 'circle' 
in order to be true. However, in the actual world, the participant 'circle' in the 
26 For instance, following Dowty's analysis here for John draws a circle, <p is John draws a circle 
and \If is the circle is drawn. <p represents a developmental process and \If the resultant phase. 
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progressives only partially exists: it is an unfinished object Where can it be fitted into? 
Dowty's inertia worlds thus help him avoid the problematic issue of unfinished 
objects in the actual world27• 
Linguists who analyze accomplishments in progressives from the standpoint that 
accomplishments are telic events face unfinished objects as a puzzling problem. On 
the one hand, they have to maintain that accomplishments are culminating events, 
therefore arguing that the unfinished objects will possibly exist at the end as long as 
the event in question carries on (as expressed by the progressive construction). Aqvist 
(1977: 38) cited in Parsons (1994: 177), for instance, in the case of Mary is drawing a 
circle, maintains that 'Mary is drawing something (an arc) in such a manner that it is 
becoming more and more the case that that thing is a circle' (1994: 178). On the other 
hand, they acknowledge that the outcome of the progressives in the case of 
accomplishments cannot be asserted. As Dowty (1977: 47) notes (22a), 'one should be 
able to conclude that some activity of drawing took place and that the existence of a 
circle was a possible but perhaps not actual outcome of this activity'. Nonetheless, if 
the problem of the progressives in the case of accomplishments is similar to the issue 
of probability in Mathematics, we can better employ a Mathematical formula - or cast 
a die to test the possibility - to solve the issue than to establish the inertia worlds. If 
the existence of an unfinished object in the case of progressive accomplishments 
cannot be asserted in the actual world, let me ask, why do these linguists still maintain 
examples such as (21a) are accomplishments, or telic events? 
27 S. Bowerman pointed out that the unfinished objects are only problematic in the IVA and in its 
perfective counterpart 'John drew a circle', the circle should exist. I agree with S. Bowerman. 
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This is because they have to theoretically distinguish accomplishments from processes; 
this is why Dowty analyzed the contrast between (21) and (22). The imperfective 
paradox is a consequential product arising from such a theoretical contrast between 
processes and accomplishments in progressives. Very differently, I maintain that when 
the contrast dissolves, the paradox does not originally exist. There is one possible way 
to dissolve this contrast; that is, treating all progressives as processes28 • (21 a) and (22a) 
are both processes, possessing the same underlying structure. 
Some works, for instance Moens and Steedman (1988), explain (20a) in terms of the 
aspectual coercion. Recall that their event nucleus comprises a preparatory process, a 
culmination and a consequent state. Accomplishments typically represent the entire 
event nucleus. The event nucleus of (2Ia) comprises only an associated preparatory 
process. As they also note, 'if a progressive combines with a culminated process 
[accomplishments], ... then the latter must also first be coerced to become a process' 
(1988: 19) and 'the most obvious way to do this is to strip off the culmination and 
leave the preparatory process behind' (ibid.). This is a common strategy in answering 
the paradox: authors first point out that accomplishments are different from processes 
in the non-progressive forms (cf. the contrast between (2Ib) and (22b». Then they 
show that in the progressive forms accomplishments undergo aspectual shift or 
coercion; as a result, an accomplishment is shifted to a process in the progressive. 
Third, they explain why telicity is cancelled or why the culmination is stripped off (cf. 
Moens and Steedman). 
28 S. Bowerman questioned whether sentences like 'John was filling a bucket with water' could 
also suit in my paradigm. As the mass noun 'water' is cumulative, it seems strange to treat 'water' as an 
unfinished object. The verb 'fill' is an incremental-theme verb (see Chapter Three), which culminates. 
When the bucket is no longer empty, it culminates. Here, we won't face the problem of unfinished 
objects, but, because of the modification by IVA, the basket is not full as the culmination point has not 
yet been reached. This example still fits in my paradigm. 
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In the present framework, I straightforwardly define that all progressives are neither 
states nor events but processes 29, so the progressive fonn of activities and 
accomplishments all behave alike. I don't have to, as the above-mentioned authors do, 
explain the differences between progressives of activities and accomplishments. 
Following Smith's defining characteristics of IVA; all progressives are imperfective 
on the account of both the initial and end points being excluded. Also, due to the fact 
that the endpoint is out of focus, all progressives are atelic. Moreover, progressives 
cannot be static. Progressives are dynamic in the sense of Comrie: they need time to 
develop. Progressives cannot be eventual either, since they lack a well-defined 
culmination. These are the unifonn characteristics progressives commonly share. 
Therefore, I do not need to first claim that there are different kinds of progressives, 
regarding to different aspectual classifications. I don't need to discriminate between 
them. ClassifYing all progressives as processes saves me from the trap of the 
imperfective paradox by avoiding unnecessary explanations such as the assumption of 
the inertia worlds, the elimination of culmination, the aspectual shift from telicity to 
atelicity, the uncertain realization of the unfinished objects, etc. 
To summarize, processes in the present framework are atelic and do not culminate. 
Progressives resemble processes due to the fact that (i) they are atelic and (ii) they do 
not culminate. 
Vlach (1981), among many authors is particularly influential in establishing progressives as 
states. Mittwoch (1988), too, holds a similar view that progressives are static. Herweg, as mentioned 
above, holds that the progressive is a special means in imperfectives by which events are converted to 
states. On the other hand, Bertinetto (1994) rejects treating progressives as states. A good discussion is 
represented in Bertinetto (I994: 396 - 406). Nevertheless, since my aim in this thesis is not to fight for 
one or the other in this issue, I will leave the comparison to the readers. As noted, I propose that all 
progressives are processes. 
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Chapter 3 Reanalyzing telicity in Mandarin Chinese 
Telicity is an inspiring field of research, for it sharpens our understanding of 
transitivity (Hopper and Thompson 1980), culmination (Moens and Steedmanl988; 
Parsons 1994), delimitedness and measure-out constraints (Tenny 1994), boundness 
(Jackendoff 1991; 1996), endpoints (Smith 1991; Depraetere 1995), predicate 
compositionality (Verkuyl 1972, 1989, 1993), incrementality (Dowty 1991) and 
quantized-cumulative properties (Krifka 1998io. More recently, Bohnemeyer and 
Swift correlate telicity with perfectivity under 'event realization' (2004: 263). Besides, 
Kratzer (2004) links telicity as a semantic component to the syntax of accusative case. 
Following Jackendoff (1991), Thompson (2006)31 recently correlates boundness and 
telicity in her syntactic representation of events. Though there seem to be many 
different approaches to telicity, I would say that many of them overlap and their 
similarities interestingly show that telicity is an old concept redefined in the new 
terminology - just like old wine in a new bottle. Vendler's climax or STP (1974: 219) 
is important to the subsequent development of the endpoint approach. Boundness in 
Jackendoff (1991) and Thompson (2006) is also connected to STP from the 
perspectives of spatial and temporal boundness. STP also appears in Krifka's 
discussions about mass-count properties of nouns (Krifka 1992: 30). Count nouns 
have 'precise limits' (ibid.) and Krifka correlates count nouns and events by showing 
that they have precise limits. I would like to start with Krifka's approach to telicity 
based on the homomorphism mapping between events and objects. 
30 See # 3 in Internet Bibliography. 

31 Thompson's terminology of 'events' is an umbrella term for states, processes and events, which 

is equivalent to 'situations' used in this dissertation. 
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3.1 Krifka: thematic relations as links between nominal reference and temporal 
constitution 
One important contribution of Kritka (1992) to aspectology is that he links events and 
objects by postulating thematic relations. Since there are established relations between 
events and objects, certain characteristics must be found as the common denominators 
for both events and objects. Two important properties can be characterised. One is 
cumulativity, and quantization is the other. The concept of Kritka's cumulativity and 
quantization can be understood from the following space-time diagram below. 
(23) 
Ir~~~~ 
w w' 
L_~~~ 
e 
t 
e --.---~ 
(Kritka 1992: 38) 
In this diagram, the axis s represents space and the axis t represents time. Kritka's 
represented relationship between objects and events is homomorphism, and the 
mapping between them is a gradual and incremental. As time moves forwards, an 
event fully develops until every part of its 'object' is used up; hence the consumption 
of the object is incremental to the creation of its event. Let us take' John ate an apple' 
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for example. John's eating of the apple corresponds to the amount of the apple being 
eaten. John's every bite fonus a subevent and every bit of the apple that has been 
eaten fonus a subpart of the object. John's last bite ofthe apple is the STP of the event. 
At this STP, the mapping between subevents and subparts naturally tenuinates; 
consequently, a change of state has occurred- the apple has been eaten. 
Verbs that have the incremental mapping relationship with their objects are known as 
'incremental-theme verbs', and can be typically referred to verbs of creation and 
consumption (Dowty 1991: 567; Tenny 1994: 15). Incremental-theme verbs possess 
Verkuyl's [+ADD TO] property in the verbal domain, so they are inherently telic. 
Because events develop in tenus of the quantity of objects, the property of objects is 
transferred to the events and, consequently, affects the overall aspectual interpretation 
of VPs. 'The basic idea, Krifka explains, is that 'with certain thematic relations, the 
reference properties of the syntactic arguments carry over to the reference properties 
of the complex construction' (1992: 38). Reference properties refer to the mass 
(cumulative) and count (quanti sed) properties of objects from the nominal domain. 
These properties will be transferred to VPs because of the established thematic 
relation held between VPs and arguments. This is how Krifka correlates an object to 
its event and explains how the property of an event is transferred to its event. 
Following Kiparsky (1998), I assume that cumulative entities possess 'divisive 
reference', that is, i r we divide an object to parts, every part is identical to its sum32. 
In (23), the symbol 11' represents an object wine on the space axis and e represents its 
event drink wine33 on the time axis. The object wine has the property of cumulativity, 
32 Kiparsky's divis; ','e reference for cumulativity is similar to Herweg's principle of distributivity. 

Both require that the PI" 'perties of the parts be identical to those of the sum. 

33 Please note that :;le contrasted examples 'drink wine' and 'drink a glass of wine' are Kritka's 
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because if we divide a quantity of wine to glasses of wine, every glass of wine is also 
wine. Every part of w, for instance w', is qualitatively identical to w. This cumulative 
property from the nominal domain is transferred to its drinking event, so e can have 
homogeneous subevents, for instance, e'. The relationship between wand e is the 
same to the relationship between w' and e'. Cumulativity applies where if e' and e" 
both fall into e, the sum of e' and e" will also be e. 
Quantization is different. Let w be a glass ofwine and e be its event drink a glass of 
wine. The object w cannot have w' that is also the same glass of wine. This means that 
a quantized object does not have a homogeneous subpart that can be mapped to the 
corresponding subevent ofdrink a glass ofwine. So, in order for drink a glass ofwine 
to be true, every drop of wine in the glass must be drunk, which means that every 
subpart of the object is mapped to every subevent in the sense of (23c) and (23d). 
Because of this, the mapping between a quantized object and its event is unique in the 
sense of (24a) and (24b). 
Krifka's next step is to establish thematic relations (R) that are held between objects 
and events. These relations are defined more clearly in Kiparsky (1998)34, so I will 
follow Kiparsky's definitions, stated in (24). 
original examples (1992: 38 39) when he explains the diagram. 

34 As noted, Kiparsky's article is downloaded online. I could not obtain the actual page number for 

the proper reference. His explicit explanations of Krifka's thematic relations (1992) in (24) are quoted 

from page 11 to 12 on the downloaded article. 
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(24) 	 (a) Uniqueness of objects: there can be no two distinct objects which bear R to 
the same event. 
(b) Uniqueness of events: there can be no two distinct events which bear R to 
the same object. 
(c) Mapping to objects: if an event bears R to an object, any subpart of the event 
bears R to some subpart of the object. 
(d) Mapping to events: if an event bears R to an object, any subpart of the object 
bears R to some subpart of the event. 
(24a) and (24b) are concomitant. (24c) and (24d) are complementary. (24a) means 
that if we have two distinct objects x and y, we will have two distinct events e1 and e2 
that each bears a patient relation to its own object (x and el; y and e2). Likewise, (24b) 
means that if we have two distinct events el and ez, there must be two distinct objects 
x and y. (24c) means that if there is an event, for instance eat an apple, every bit of the 
eating event has a corresponding bit of the apple and they have the same thematic 
relation (in this case, a PATIENT relation) throughout the mapping. (24d) can be 
explained in the converse way of (24c): if there is an event that bears a PATIENT 
relation to its object, then every subpart of the object also bears the same PATIENT 
relation to its own subevent. 
Now we can correlate cumulativity and quantization to atelicity and telicity 
respectively. As for cumulativity, the mapping between Wi and e' forms the same event 
as the mapping between w and e does in (23). So, it is not necessary for all w to be 
mapped to e in order to develop the complete e event: any subevent represents the 
total event. But for quantisation, the mapping between w' and e' is not the same as that 
between w and e, so it is necessary for every subpart of w to be mapped to every 
subevent of e, in order for the complete e to exist. When every part of w has been 
successfully mapped, e reaches an inherent endpoint. Krifka calls this inherent 
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endpoint 'a set terminal point' (1992: 30), which is similar to Vendler's STP. 
Sometimes, predicates are ambiguous in that they can have telic and atelic 
interpretations. Krifka's solution is that if an iterative reading or a partitive reading is 
included, a predicate is atelic; otherwise, telic (1992: 40 41). Uniqueness of objects 
in (24a) ensures that the same object is 'not done twice' (cf. Kiparsky 1998), so the 
iterative reading is avoided. Mapping to objects in (23c) ensures that every subpart of 
an object and every subevent of an event are mapped under the same thematic relation 
in order to be quantized, and because of this, the partitive reading is avoided. A 
partitive reading occurs where only some, but not all, parts of an object are mapped to 
some subevents. For instance, (25a) can have an atelic reading in (25b) and a telic 
reading in (25c). (25d) can only have an atelic reading. 
(25) (a) John read the letter. 
(b) John read the letter for an hour. 
(c) John read the letter in an hour. 
(d) John read for an hourI *in an hour. 
(25b) acquires the atelic reading from the iterative or partitive interpretation. The 
iterative reading suggests that John read the letter repeatedly and that repetition 
carried on for an hour. The partitive reading suggests that it took an hour for John to 
read only some parts, but not the entirety, of the letter. By excluding the iterative and 
partitive readings, (24c) is telic and it implies that John finished reading the entire 
letter in an hour and it did not repeat. In (24c), the direct object the letter is unique 
because a PATIENT relation correlates John's reading event with nothing else but that 
particular letter. Conditions (23a) and (23c) thus apply in (24c) to satisfy quantisation 
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and derive telicity. (24d) is atelic, due to the absence of a direct object argument. As 
the direct object is absent in (24d), there is no mapping between John's reading and 
what John read. 
MolIa-Aliod (1997)35 explains Krifka's mapping between events and objects a bit 
more clearly: since a count noun and a telic verb have the same property of 
quantization (QUA), and a mass noun and an atelic verb have the same property of 
cumulativity (CUM), 'it is possible for the NP to transfer its properties to the VP', and 
'this transference will be possible thanks to the thematic relations' (1997: 67). A 
quantized DP 'anlthe apple' can transfer the QUA property to an eating event, 
resulting in an overall QUA predicate 'eat althe apple'. On the other hand, a 
cumulative DP 'apples' transfers the CUM property to an eating event, resulting in an 
overall CUM predicate 'eat apples'. Also, a quantized DP 'althe apple' cannot transfer 
its QUA property to a verb with CUM property, due to different thematic relations. 
From Krifka's mapping to events and mapping to objects, we can infer that a VP has 
QUA if there is a thematic relation between AGENT and THEME and the THEME 
argument is quantized. The THEME argument plays an important role here. Tenny 
(1994), for instance, made a strong emphasis on the necessity of a direct object in 
measuring out an event. 
In the next section, I will examine the compositional conditions of telicity, paying 
attention to the concept 'boundness'. 
35 Please see # 5 in Internet Bibliography. 
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3.2 The compositional conditions oftelicity 
Boundness is a widespread concept in the discussion of telicity in literature. It can be 
captured by Thompson (2006: 215) below. I formulate a table that includes an 
exclusive range of aspectual interactions from Thompson's (26) in (27). Typical 
examples of (27) are given in (28). 
(26) (a) [bounded] verb, [bounded] Aspect, [bounded] direct object 
(b) [bounded] verb, [bounded] Aspect, [bounded] PP (2006: 215) 
(27) An exclusive range ofpossible aspectual interactions within a VP 
+ bounded 
+ culminate + count 
bounded 
+ bounded 
- count- culminate 
- bounded 
+ bounded 
-culminate + count 
bounded 
. + bounded 
- count+ culminate 
- bounded 
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(28) (a) John built a house in three months. 
(b) John was building a house *in three months. 
(c) John built a house *for three months. 
(d) John was building a house for three months. 
(e) John watched TV in two hours. 
(f) John was watching TV *in two hours. 
(g) John watched TV for two hours. 
(h) John was watching TV for two hours. 
(i) John read two books in three days. 

G) John was reading two books in three days. 

(k) John read two books for three days. 
(1) John was reading two books for three days. 
(m) John built houses *in three years. 
(n) John was building houses in three years. 
(0) John built houses for three years. 
(p) John was building houses for three years. 
In addition to Krifka, we have explored the ideas of various authors in 2.1. 
Thompson's (bounded) verbs refer to Vendler's accomplishments and achievements, 
which have a STP and culminate. The mass-count nominal properties also affect the 
overall aspectual interpretation of a VP. If a VP is constituted by a count noun and a 
verb with an inherent culmination, the VP is quantized; hence telic. If a VP is 
constituted by a mass noun and a verb with an inherent culmination, the VP is 
cumulative; hence atelic. If a VP is constituted by a count noun and a verb without 
inherent culmination, the VP can either have an atelic or telic interpretation, 
depending on its adverbial modification, as shown by Krifka's examples in (25). This 
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is the result of aspectual interactions without considering PP and ASP. I use Dowty's 
'in a time' for the feature [+bounded] PP and 'for a time' for [- bounded] PP. The 
contrast between PVA and IVA in (28) is the contrast between English simple past 
tense and the progressive construction. After adding PP and ASP, Thompson's 
formulation in (26) is confirmed, except for the example (28i). (28i) has two readings. 
The telic reading is that John finished reading those two books in three days. The 
atelic reading is a partitive one: John read parts of the two books in three days and did 
not finish reading either or both of them. The iterative reading is excluded, as the 
repetition reading of this event does not likely to happen in the actual world. 
The partitive reading is not allowed in (28c). When the accomplishment verb 'build' 
is modified by PVA and has a count NP for complement, Krifka's mapping to events 
and mapping to objects apply. Since the accomplishment verb has a STP and the use 
of PVA ensures that the mapping between all subevents and subparts of the objects 
must completely reach the STP, the house must be existent at the STP and the building 
event must have a definite, delimited period. This is why an unbounded PP does not 
work here. Likewise, the culminated reading is not allowed in (28b). Although the 
accomplishment verb has a STP, the mappings between all subevents and subparts of 
the object do not necessarily reach the STP due to IVA. So, a bounded PP does not 
work in (28b). (28t) is problematic: watching TV is an atelic process which does not 
have an inherent STP and is modified by IVA, so a bounded PP is semantically 
incompatible with it. (28m) is problematic because of the unspecified DP. Chomsky 
(1999, fn. 10)36 cited in Radford (2004: 144) points out that 'nonspecifics, quantified 
and predicate nominals' are not true DPs, so following Chomsky, our example houses 
36 Chomsky's version, from Kenstowicz(ed.) (2001: ) 52). The footnote 10 is from 
Kenstowicz (2001: 43) 
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in (27m) should be a QP headed by a null partitive quantifier and, consequently, the 
mappings between subevents of building and subparts of a partitive object are also 
partial. In a sharp contrast to (28a), where all mappings between subevents and 
subparts are successful, (28m) is not so. The bounded PP could modify built houses, 
but listeners may wonder how many houses were exactly built. (28m) is semantically 
vague rather than ungrammatical37 , 
The verbs of motion are left out in (28). They don't fit in because they don't have a 
DP complement, but a PP. We have seen that PPs are temporally bounded in (27). A 
PP can be also spatially bounded. This is particularly relevant to motion verbs. Motion 
verbs without a spatially bounded PP are atelic, and those with a spatially bounded PP 
are telic. See examples in (29). 
(29) (a) John drove/ walked! ran to Cape Town. (telic) 
(b) John drove/ walked/ ran towards Cape Town. (atelic) 
(c) John drove/ walked/ ran in Cape Town. (atelic) 
(d) John drove/ walked! ran. (atelic) 
(29a) is telic because the bounded PP provides a STP and the use ofPVA ensures that 
the action must completely reach the STP. Although the PPs in (29b) and (29c) 
specify destination and location, they do not provide a STP for the action. (29d) is 
atelic due to the lack of a bounded PP. 
S. Bowerman comments on this example, indicating that this example could mean that John has 
built several houses, each taking three years. What I want to emphasize here is that we don't know how 
many houses exactly are built in three years. The vagueness of this sentence could be clarified by 
specifying the exact quantity ofhouses. 
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Now, we have seen that telicity is composed of one or more of these four factors: V, N, 
PP and ASP. Boundness is indispensable in each factor. V is bounded if it has a STP. 
N is bounded because a count noun has 'precise limits" to borrow from Krifka (1992: 
30). PP can be temporally or spatially bounded. ASP is bounded if it is PYA. 
Among authors of the endpoint approach to telicity, Depraetere (1995) draws my 
attention because, very differently, she distinguishes boundness from telicity. Recall 
Smith's argument for classifying activities as a subcategory of events in 2. L7. There 
are connections between Smith (1999) and Depraetere (1995), concerning the 
correlation between the intrinsically telic boundness and temporally boundness. My 
argument here is that if a situation is bounded by telicity, it can also be temporally 
bounded in the sense of Dowty's in-a-time, but not in the sense of his for-a-time 
modification. Boundness by telicity always correlates to temporal boundness. 
Duration is not temporally bounded: it is a temporal length that a situation lasts in 
time. Smith seems to confuse between temporal boundness and temporal duration. 
Activities can be modified by temporal duration. Recall Smith's example Mary played 
her violin for an hour in 3 hours (1999: 484). One could argue that if the expression 
for an hour is taken off, Mary's playing violin acquires a partitive reading and one is 
not sure whether she would finish playing her violin in those 3 hours. On the other 
hand, if the expression in 3 hours is taken off, it is sure that Mary's playing her violin 
at least lasts for an hour, but crucially, whether she finishes playing violin or she 
continues after that one hour is an open-end question. As noted, telicity concerns an 
event's culmination at the endpoint. If one is not sure whether Mary's play finishes or 
continues at the endpoint, one can doubt whether the situation described is essentially 
telic or not. Concerning Smith's example above, I would say that even though 
Dowty's in-a-time test applies, it is still an open-end question whether Mary finishes 
62 

Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
playing her violin is true. 
From my understanding of Depraetere's article (1995), Depraetere separates telicity 
from boundness in terms of their temporal boundary: whereas a telic situation must 
have a natural endpoint, a bounded situation does not have to. '(A)telicity has to do 
with whether or not a situation is described as having an inherent or intended 
endpoint', Depraetere argues, '(un)boundness relates to whether or not a situation is 
described as having reached a temporal boundary' (1995: 2 - 3). My aim in this 
subsection is to refute this argument. A bounded situation is telic~ a telic situation 
must have an inherent endpoint; and therefore, telicity is associated with the temporal 
boundary. It is thus not necessary to separate boundness and telicity. 
Examples (30a) and (30c) below, from Depraetere (1995), show that a bounded 
situation is not necessarily telic, and examples (30c) and (30d) show that a telic 
situation is not necessarily bounded. Moreover, examples (30c) and (30d) show that 
the use of the progressive significantly affects whether a situation is bounded but does 
not affect the telicity of a situation. 
(30) (a) Judith played in the garden for an hour. 	 [atelic, bounded] 
(Depraeterer's original example 2b, p.3) 
(b) John read books. [atelic, unbounded] 
(Original example 8b, p. 5) 
(c) John opened the parcel. [telic, bounded] 
(Original example Sa, p. 5) 
(d) John was opening the parcel. [telic, unbounded] 
(Original example 5b, p. 5) 
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Depraetere also shows that the use of the progressive fonn does not necessarily cause 
a situation to be unbounded. The use of the perfect can overrule the unbound reading 
because the use of the perfect entails a bounded situation, as the example (31) shows. 
Examples in (32) (Depraetere 1995: 5) show that if a situation is habitual or iterative, 
it is definitely atelic and unbounded. 
(31) (a) A: Why are your hands so dirty? 
B: I've been playing in the mud. [bounded by the perfect] 
(Depraetere 1995: 5; ex. lla) 
(32) (a) John left at eight o'clock. [telic, bounded] (1995: 5; ex. 7a) 
(b) John leaves at eight o'clock. [atelic, unbounded] (1995: 5; ex. 7b) 
(c) John eats an apple every day. [atelic, unbounded] (1995: 5; ex. 9c) 
What is surprising is that Depraetere does not explain why telicity and boundness 
must be discriminated. Though she observed that boundness appears less frequently 
than telicity in the literature, this can not be a convincing explanation why boundness 
should be necessarily separated from telicity. Why is it not convincing enough? 
Because temporal boundary and the natural endpoint of a telic situation always 
overlap. It is hard to conceive that a telic situation that has reached its natural 
endpoint does not reach its temporal boundary at the same time. Moreover, there is 
room for dispute over whether the use of the progressive, as Depraetere maintains, 
does not affect telicity at all. It should not be surprising that the unbound situation 
represented in (31 d) is still telic, since Depraetere defines telicity from the pure 
endpoint approach without considering the necessary involvement of time for a 
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situation to arrive at the endpoint. True, (31 d) is unbounded; therefore, it cannot be 
telic. Under the present framework, all progressives are treated as processes and 
processes are by default atelic. 
To summarize this section, I use Van Hout's (2000) account to capture the agreements 
reached in the literature: 
(33) 	(a) If there is no direct object, as in unergative or conative verb frames, there is 
no telicity. 
(b) If there is an object in a transitive frame, but it is not quantized, as with mass 
terms and bare plurals, there is no telicity either. 
(c) If there is a quantized object in a transitive frame, but the verb does not have 
a telic event type and does not have the lexical property of incrementality (for 
example, verbs of the push-class and stative verbs), there is also no telicity. 
(Van Hout 2000: 254) 
I rewrite Van Hout's three ifs as three musts in (34): 
(34) (a) There must be a direct object. 
(b) The direct object must be a count or quantized nominal. 
(c) The verbal predicate must possess incrementality38 as a crucial cretierion. 
38 Following Kritka (1992), an incremental verb has stages in its mapping to objects. Canonical 
accomplishment verbs have stages, where the mappings between events and objects take place 
incrementally, stage by stage, until reaching the STP. Verbs ofpush class are processes because they 
don't possess stages the action of pushing, for instance, is homogeneous in the sense that every 
subevent of pushing is also pushing and more importantly, we can't find subparts of the objects that are 
pushed. If John pushes a cart, not parts of the cart but the cart itself is being pushed. This is why verbs 
of push class do not have incremental mappings between events and objects and why they fail to have 
culmination. 
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Now I will apply these compositional conditions to MC. 
3.3 	 Reanalyzing telicity in Mandarin Chinese 
MC is well-known for being a salient example of an isolating language. Every 
character is monosyllabic, so traditionally every character is treated as a morpheme. 
The language is marked for having a large number of free morphemes; morphological 
affixations and inflections do not frequently take place. Nouns are not inflected for 
number, gender, case and definiteness. Verbs are not inflected for person, number and 
tense, though free morphemes for IVA and PVA do occur. 
Since morphological inflections and affixations do not frequently occur in MC, 
plurality is not overtly expressed by morphology in MC, as it is in English. An 
immediate question arises: if this is so, how do the native Chinese semantically 
discriminate between singularity and plurality? Let me start with some examples. 
(35) (a) .. shu 'book(s)' 
(b) mliang '* ben shu 

two CL (volume) book 

'two books' 

(c) it zhe '* ben .. shu 

this CL book 

'this book' 

(d) 	 zhe mliang '* ben .. shu 

this two CL book 

'these two books' 
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No morphology in the character (35a) indicates number, gender, case and definiteness. 
As number and definiteness are not specified, (35a) thus has a range of interpretations: 
a book, the book, books, and the books. Number is specified in (35b), so it denotes 
'two books'. Definiteness is specified in (35c), so it denotes 'this book'. Number and 
definiteness are both present in (35d), so it denotes 'these two books'. As observed, 
the classifier precedes the noun, number precedes the classifier and the demonstrative 
precedes the number. The same classifier is found in (35b), (35c) and (35d). Without 
the classifier ben these examples are ungrammaticaL 
The question concerns us here is why the classifier ben is necessary for 
grammaticality in (35b) (35d). One plausible explanation for this is that the noun 
shu is a mass noun. Mass nouns cannot be quantified without measurement units. For 
example, the mass noun 'water' in English cannot be quantified without a classifier 
like 'cup'. Generalizing from this, since MC nouns always need a classifier when 
quantified, MC nouns are by default mass. This is also held by Chiercha (1998). 
Therefore, plurality in MC is generated from number and a quantified NP must have a 
classifier. Nouns in MC cannot be the direct complement of number and 
demonstrati ves. 
I follow Chomsky cited in Radford (2004: 144) and assume that all bare nouns in MC 
are QPs headed by a null partitive quantifier. If the partitive quantifier is null, the 
noun has a mass, unspecified, partitive quantity. If the partitive quantifier is specified, 
the noun has a count, specified, non-partitive quantity. My example (35a) represents a 
bare plural bearing a null partitive quantifier, whereas (35b) - (35d) represents a count 
NP with a specified quantifier. 
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There must be a grammatical agreement between nouns and classifiers in MC, but 
what kind of nature pertaining to the agreement is questionable. Classifiers are 
noun-sensitive. For instance, the noun shu 'book' selects ben 'volume' as its classifier, 
but not zhang 'piece'. There must be some rules that constrain the selection between a 
noun and its classifier, but what are they? There are more than a hundred of classifiers 
and thousands of nouns. The pairing between them must be many; some of them are 
not even one-to-one, but one-to-many. Is the agreement between a noun and its 
selected classifier in MC similar to the agreement between present tense and the third 
person singular in English? Many classifiers in MC seem to be universal, for instance, 
a 'cup' of water and a 'piece' of paper. Their usage is identical as in English. But 
some MC classifiers are language specific. It is thus difficult to determine whether 
classifiers in MC belong to lexical categories or functional categories. They could 
belong to lexical categories, because they 'have lexical/descriptive content' (Radford 
1997: 38). The classifier 'cup' in the phrase 'a cup of water', for instance, has lexical 
content as an ordinary noun does. However, they could also belong to functional 
categories, because they 'have an essentially grammatical function' (ibid.). Classifiers 
are grammatically necessary for linking quantifiers and nouns. Chomsky'S minimalist 
program (Chomsky 1995) does not include this kind of agreement, and it would be 
better if this kind of agreement could be accounted for in Chomsky'S Minimalist 
Syntax. These are the questions in my mind when describing the quantification of the 
MC NPs. My next step is to show the interactions between accomplishment verbs and 
NPs inMC. 
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Since nouns without a specified Q and a classifier are mass, and mass nouns can 
occupy an argument position, following Krifka's mapping to events and mapping to 
objects, the resulting VP is cumulative. For instance, 
(36) Translating typical accomplishment verbs in English to Me 
(a) ~ chI ~ ping =* guo 
eat 	 apples 

'eat apples' 

(b) ~ xie 1~ xin 
write 	 letter 

'write (to someone)' 

(c) :! gai 7\. da ~ xue 
build 	 universities 

'build universities' 

(d) I: hua til yuan III quan 
draw 	 circles 

'draw circles' 

Like English, at chI ~ xie .!. gai I: hua are incremental in that they can have 
internal stages that lead to the STP. Unlike English, the nominal complement in each 
case is headed by a null partitive quantifier, so it is mass. The direct object in each 
case cannot have discrete subparts that can be mapped to events, so the resulting VP is 
cumulative and can be treated as process. The Me examples in (36) are not 
accomplishments but processes. This said, are there no accomplishments in Me? This 
is an interesting question that I want to put forward. 
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Two previous authors, Tai (1984, 2003) and Lin (2004), independently argued that in 
MC accomplishments and achievements resemble resultative predicates and they 
should have a result complement. Tai is the first Chinese linguist to examine Vendler's 
classifications in MC, and in his paper (1984), he implied that the classic Vendlerian 
accomplishment verbs, i.e., paint, build and write, in their single character form are 
activities, thus not telic. If this is correct, Tai means that tI!:, chI 1?; xie 1. gai j: hmi 
in our example (36) are processes: they don't have incremental, internal stages and a 
STP. Almost two decades later, Tai (2003) advances his original arguments from 1984 
and argues for linguistic relativism, hypothesizing that 'English speakers tend to 
attend relatively more to the process of an event, but, in contrast, Chinese relatively 
more to the result' (2003: 311). In Tai's words, 
... in contrast with the four semantic categories which Vendler (1967) has 
proposed for English, Chinese has only states, activities, and result, lacking 
accomplishment and achievement categories. The later two categories are 
expressed mostly in action-result verb compounds (V I-V2)' (Tai 2003: 306) 
The other work supporting Tai (1984) is Shi (1988) cited in Lin (2004: 55), who 
classified achievements and states alike, and activities and accomplishments alike. Shi 
implied that accomplishments are derived from activities, and achievements from 
states. In other words, states and activities are the two prime categories in MC, 
echoing Tai's statement above. 
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Achievements are basically states, but they differ from states in that they 
describe new states, i.e., change of state. Accomplishments are basically 
activities, but they differ from activities in that they encode causative activities. 
(Shi 1988: 59) 
A good example to demonstrate the relationship between Shi's states and change of 
states is the state 'thick' and the change of state 'thickened'. It is clear that 
morphological processes take place from 'thick' to 'thicken' and from 'thicken' to 
'thickened', The morpheme [en] encodes causativity: something is caused to become 
thick. Verbs that have causative morphemes such as [en] are inherently telic. The verb 
'thicken' describes the process that something is caused to become thick, but unless 
the change of state is produced (in English it is realized by the past participle -ed), 
something has not become thickened. So, Shi's argument makes sense here. 
In 2004, Lin moved a step further by formalizing Tai's arguments, and his claim in 
(37a) and 37b) echoes Tai's (2003: 306) and Shi's (1988: 59) passages above. 
(37) (a) For the most part, activity and state are the only two primitive verbal types 
in Mandarin Chinese. As a general rule, change of state predicates 
(accomplishments and achievements) are derived syntactically. 
(b) With very few exceptions, no monomorphemic verbs in Mandarin are telic ­
no monomorphemic verb encodes a result, a natural end point, an end state, or 
the attainment of a goal. 
(c) The particle Ie signals inchoativity. (Lin 2004: 53) 
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Would MC differ from English concerning the structure of accomplishments and 
achievements? Is Lin's claim in (37a) applicable? Let us first analyze how processes 
and accomplishments are formed in MC and how PVA and IVA constrain them. If 
we add number and classifier to the nominal complement in (36), forming a specified 
QP, we can shift the atelic processes to telic accomplishments, as follows: 
(38) Deriving accomplishments 
(a) tt chI - yI ~ ke ~ ping *guo 
eat 	 one CL apple 

'eat one apple' 

(b) xie ffi liang it ieng 1§" xin 
write 	 two CL letter 

'write two letters' 

(c) gai'=:' san i ?JT suo *- da ~ xue 
build 	 three CL universities 

'build three universities' 

(d) .I hua IZY SI 100 ge lil yuan rm quan 
draw 	 four CL circles 

'draw four circles' 

After adding a specified quantifier and a classifier, the nominal complements in (38) 
'become' count nouns, so they can have discrete SUbparts. Unlike those examples in 
(36), the mapping between subevents and subparts in (38) is possible. This means 
that when all the mappings reach the STP, all subparts are mapped and the complete 
event exists. This is clearer if we add the post-verbal PVAmarker J Ie. 
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(39) PYA Modification 
(a) Pf. chi 1 Ie - yi ~ ke ~ ping *guo 
eat 	 PYA one CL apple 

'ate one apple' 

(b) ~ xie 1 Ie fi9 liang if reng xin 
write 	 PYA two CL letter 

'wrote two letters' 

(c) 1[ gai 1 Ie :=.. san i ]iff suo *- da *xue 
build 	 PYA three CL universities 

'built three universities' 

(d) -= hua 1 Ie IZY si 100 ge 00 yuan III quan 
draw 	 PYA four CL circles 

'drew four circles' 

Readers may note that I used past tense in the English translation in (39). Why past 
tense? In the last paragraph, I have explained that the mappings between subevents 
and subparts are possible, and now in (39) due to the PYA modification; the events 
they encode must have been completed. The use of PYA ensures that the time interval 
during which a telic situation occurs must precede the utterance time on the temporal 
linear analogy; otherwise, if the time interval overlaps with the utterance time, IVA is 
used. The time interval of a telic situation's occurrence must be located before the 
utterance time, in order to ensure that the truth-value of the telic situation is true. For 
instance, if we have an AGENT argument John in (39b) and we have Mary to report 
John's writing event, the time interval of John's writing event must precede the 
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utterance time of Mary's report, so John's writing event is true. 
The partitive reading is not possible in (39), as the null partitive quantifier is replaced 
by the numeral. One could argue that (39a) has an extra reading - the indefinite 
reading. Since MC lacks definite and indefinite articles, the numeral 'one' in MC 
plays a role similar to the English indefinite article a. True, (39a) can have the 
indefinite reading and be thus distinguished from the rest, but (39a) does not become 
atelic because of the indefinite reading. If John ate an apple (in MC and English) is 
true, the entire apple, not a half of the apple, must be eaten up, irrespective of the 
apple being definite or not. Having introduced PVA modification, let us see how 
IVA modification affects (38). 
(40) IVA Modification 
(a) 1£ ziti pi chI - yl WJl ke ~ ping *- guo 
IVA 	 eat one CL apple 

'be eating one apple' 

(b) 1£ ziti ~ xie ffJ liang M !eng 1~ xin 
IVA 	 write two CL letter 

'be writing two letters' 

(c) .t£ zai :i. giti .=. san i !iff suo *- dit ~ xue 
IVA 	 build three CL universities 

'be building three universities' 

(d) 1£ ziti :I huit gy si 100 ge Ii yuan til quan 
IVA 	 draw four CL circles 

'be drawing four circles' 
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One may wonder how a man could write two letters/ build three universities/ draw 
four circles at the same time. Perhaps, a very capable man can manage that. But 
situations like John was drinking three cups ofwine in real life are unlikely to happen, 
as logically only one cup at each time was drunk39• So, the use ofIVA can contradict 
to the number of events described by a situation. MC is not an exception. What I 
would like to point out is that IVA in MC requires the object position to be filled, as 
(41) demonstrates. 
(41) IVA Modification 
(a) ;(f zai rt chI ~ ping *guo 
IVA 	 eat apples 

'be eating (some) apples' 

(b) 1£ zai 1.?; xie it xin 
IVA 	 write letter 

'be writing (some) letters' 

(c) ;(f ziti l. giti *- dit ~ xu!:! 
IVA 	 build universities 

'be building (some) universities' 

(d) ;(f zai • huit !il yuan I qulin 
IVA 	 draw circles 

'be drawing (some) circles' 

39 S. Bowerman comments on this, indicating that in the realm of possibility, it is not impossible 
that a builder can easily have three projects on the go at once, even if he is not physically doing the 
building. Whether situations described by language and the real life exactly correspond, I think, depend 
on our pragmatic knowledge ofthe world. It is unlikely that when a speaker says 'I am drinking two 
cups of water' at the same time when he is drinking one cup each time only. 
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(e) 	 *1£ zai Ill. chI 

IVA eat 

'be eating' 

(1) 	 *1£ zai ~ xie 

IVA write 

'be writing' 

(g) 	 *1£ zai 1: gai 

IVA build 

'be building' 

(h) 	 *1£ zai J: hua 

IVA draw 

'be drawing' 

As noted above, the nominal complements in (41a - 41d) are mass, so the entire VP 
can be considered as process. The modification of IVA does not result in semantic 
contradiction, since number is not specified. Now, the problem is that we cannot leave 
out the direct object. In English, the unspecified NPs can be left unexpressed but this 
is not allowed in Me. This is known as 'Unspecified NP Deletion' (Tenny 1994: 44). 
To express (41e - 41h) grammatically, we need to fill up the direct object position, as 
(42) shows. 
(42) The correction for (41e - h) 
(a) 1£ zai Ill. chI ~ fan 

IVA eat cooked rice/ meal 

'be eating' 
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(b) 1£ zai ~ xie *zi 

IVA write characters 

'be writing' 

(c) 	1£ zai :l. gai }jf fang T zi 

IVA build houses 

'be building' 

(d) 1£ zt!i I: hut! I: hut!40 

IVA draw pictures 

'be drawing' 

From (36), (38), (39), (40), (41) and (42), I would conclude that verbs that have 
incremental property (thus culminate at the endpoint of mappings between subevents 
and subparts of the object) in Me should have the following features: 
(43) The syntactic properties ofVPs containing an incremental verb 
(a) VPs consist of a V and a QP41. QP cannot be omitted, and the Q is either 0 
(null, unspecified) or specified (not 0 and also including the numeral 'one'). 
(b) The Q in QP can be unspecified or specified. 	If unspecified, the VP will be 
cumulative and atelic. If specified, the VP will be quantized and telic. 
(c) In the case of an unspecified QP, an alternative way to shift from atelicity to 
telicity is to add a resultant state. 
40 Thanks to S. Bowerman. He is right that we have an example of zero derivation here. The verb 
'paint; draw' and the noun 'paint; picture' in this case are morphologically and phonologically 
identical. 
41 Please note that the idea of specified/unspecified QPs come from Chomsky cited in Radford 
(2004: 144). 
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(d) In the case of a specified QP, the addition of a resultant state clarifies what 
the result is but does not affect the telic reading. 
(e) Since PYA indicates completeness, if PYA exists with a specified QP and an 
incremental verb, telicity is derived without a resultant state. It is not 
ungrammatical to add a resultant state to a quantized VP modified by PYA, it 
is just semantically redundant. 
Now we can come back to Tai's and Lin's arguments. The central argument ofTai is 
that the resultant complement is indispensable in forming telic predicates, as (42) 
shows. Tai thus concludes that the overt expression of a resultant state guarantees 
telicity. Lin similarly argues that since there are no monomorphemic telic verbs in Me 
(except for a few exceptions), the result complement is necessary. I would argue that 
as far as the correlation between resultant state and telicity is concerned, Tai and Lin 
are correct, but telicity is not derived from the resultant state only. As we have seen 
Krifka (1992) and Thompson (2006), telicity is composed of the interactions between 
nominal and verbal properties. We should reconsider whether Lin's argument for the 
lacking of mono morphemic telic verbs is applicable or not. 
(44) (a) -t ka lfL cM ~ nian jE S1 J Ie ~~ yue ¥$t him (ex. 14) 0 
truck grind-die-ASp42 John 
'The truck killed John by running him over.' 
(b) 1tl!. ta t.tl qiao :1E sl J Ie #J yue ~ han (ex. 15) 0 
he knock-die-ASP John 
'He killed John by hitting him with a hammer (stone, stick, etc.).' 
42 Please note that Tai's ASP here refers to my PYA. 
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(c) 1i£. ta h" dl1 ?E sI l' Ie ~~ yue ~ han Q 	 (ex. 16) 
he 	 hit-die-ASP John 
'He killed John by hitting him (with or without an instrument).' 
(d) 1i£. Hi 1r'men • dli ?E sl l' Ie ~~ yue *i him (ex. 21)0 
they poison-die-ASP John 

'They killed John with poison.' 

(Tai 2003: 307 - 308 passim.) 

(45) (a) 1i£. til tr dl1 l' Ie ~ yue ~ han 0 (compare 43c) 
hit PYA John 

'He hit John.' 

(b) *-t kl1 .f che ~ nil1n l' Ie ~ yue ~ him • (compare 43a) 
truck grind PYA John 

'The truck ran over John.' 

(c) *1i£. til • dli l' Ie ~ yue ~ han (compare 43d) Q 
3rd(s.) poison PYA John 

'He poisoned John.' 

Firstly, Tai's evidence, reproduced in (44) suggests that a resultant complement must 
be present, or (45b) and (45c) will be ungrammatical. The presence/absence of a 
resultant complement affects the grammaticality in (45). According to rai, (45a) 
merely says that someone hit John without any consequence but in (44c) the presence 
of the resultant complement sf 'die', together with PYA, ensures that the PATIENT is 
dead. Tai maintained that the first element in the resultative compound is the means 
by which the result is achieved, as we can see the by-phrase from Tai's English 
translation. From here Tai maintains that the resultant complement is the head of the 
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resultative predicate. Secondly, Tai uses these examples to demonstrate that 'result' is 
a prime semantic category in MC. If the result head is not expressed, English 
accomplishment and achievement verbs are activities in MC. This can be seen from 
Tai's (2003: 306) more radical examples in (46), where Tai shows that English 
sentence like (46a) is not grammatical. 'Kill' in English is inherently telic. If 'John 
killed Mary' is true, 'Mary is dead' is also true. However, that is not always true in 
MC, and this all depends on whether the result is overtly expressed (ibid.). In (46b) 
the equivalent of 'kill' in MC is the monomorphemic ~ sha, while in (46c) the 
equivalent of 'kill' is ~ sha 7E S1 (Vkill-Vdie). According to Tai, sha in (46b) is not 
telic, so it can't be the true equivalent of English 'kill'. For Tai, the PATIENT John 
did not die in (46b), as the monomorphemic verb ~ sha merely describes the 
attempt of killing and does not necessarily guarantee the death of John, even though it 
is modified by PYA. To ensure that John's death is certain, we need an overt 
resultative 7E SI , as in (46c). Once the death of John is ensured (as in the first clause 
of 46c), one cannot claim John didn't die (as in the second clause of 46c); otherwise 
the truth-value of these two clauses will be contradictory. (46c) is ungrammatical 
because the speaker cannot claim John is not dead in the disjunction clause while 
claiming that John is dead in the first clause. 
(46) (a) *1 killed John, but he didn't die. 
(b) ~ WQ ~ sha 3 Ie ~~ yue ~ han mWing *- ci '11t!. ta ~ dou 51 mei 7E sl 0 
I kill-ASP John two CL he all not die 
'I performed the action of attempting to kill John twice, but he didn't die.' 
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(c) * ft WQ ~ sha jE S1 J Ie ft.:~ yue ~ him mliang *ci ' 1m ta til dou 
I kill-die-ASP John two CL he all 
~ mei ~ sl 0 
not die 
* 'I killed John twice, but he didn't die.' 

(Tai 2003: 306; example (11), (12) and (13) respectively.) 

Though (46b) sounds acceptable to Tai's ear, it is not so to mine for semantic reasons. 
The question that concerns us here is whether the verb sha 'kill' contains Parsons' 
culmination, identical to its English counterpart. For Tai, the feature, culmination, 
should be contained in the resultant component. 'In fact,' Tai argues, 'I would argue 
that the verb 'to kill' doesn't really exist in Chinese. On the other hand, many 
Chinese action-result verb compounds involving si 'to die' can be translated into to 
'to kill' in English' (2003: 306 - 307). This is why John's death is not definite in 
(46b). 
But this is misleading. ~ sha 'to kill' in both MC and English is a typical two-place, 
transitive-accusative predicate, while jE si 'to die' is a typical one-place, 
unaccusative predicate. In the former, we expect to find a thematic relation between 
an AGENT and a PATIENT, while in the latter the argument bearing EXPERIENCER 
is moved to the syntactic subject position. Their difference is quite clear from their 
different argument structures, so I cannot agree with Tai's argument that the 
unaccusative verb jE sl in MC is equivalent to English 'to kill' and ~ sha is unlike 
English 'to kill'. For me, ~ sM. is equivalent to English 'kill', in that they both imply 
the death of the PATIENT. When they are modified by PYA, it is certain that the 
PATIENT must be dead. 
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Humans share similar expenences in the world, and we might expect that the 
experiences of birth, aging, illness, and death should be universal across different 
cultures and languages. Though different languages are not the same grammatically, 
they should be able to describe these experiences similarly. Concerning the 
grammaticality of (46b), I would say that the two disjunction clauses are contradictory 
in their truth-value. Not only this, the frequency adverb 'two times' results in a 
distributive reading, and it is this reading that the effect of the Agent's killing of John 
is weakened. If the sentence 'A killed B twice' is true, we can only assume that A's 
first attempt must have failed. Actually such a sentence is not possible in English, as 
'A killed B' conveys that A's killing has successfully caused B's death. This is because 
'kill' in English is inherently telic. Likewise, I would suggest that the same verb ~ 
sM. is also inherently telic in MC. 
From the discussions above, now I can attempt to answer the question I raised in the 
introduction, concerning (i) in which circumstances resultatives are obligatory to 
express telicity, (ii) in which circumstances resultatives are not obligatory, and (iii) the 
reasons for (i) and (ii). The answer can be derived from my generalizations in (43): 
resultative predicates are obligatory to express telicity if there are unspecified QPs 
and resultative predicates are not obligatory if there are specified QPs and PYA Ie 
modifies the VP. Unspecified QPs in MC are like bare plurals in English and they are 
inherently mass. Specified QPs consist of a numeral and a classifier, the numeral 
specifies Q and requires the presence of a classifier to match the noun, and result in a 
quantified NP. Following Krifka's quantisation and cumulativity (Krifka 1992), VPs 
that consist of an incremental theme verb and a quantified NP are quantized, hence 
telic; conversely, VPs that consist of an incremental theme verb and a non-quantified 
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NP are cumulative; hence atelic. If a VP is atelic in accordance with Krifka's 
definition of cumulativity, a resultant predicate is obligatory to construct telicity by 
specifying the result. According to Moens and Steedman's event nucleus (1988), the 
presence of a resultant state ensures culmination, so the specification of result is 
evident for telicity. On the other hand, if a VP is already telic in accordance with 
Krifka's definition of quantisation, a resultative is not obligatory. One could add the 
resultant predicate to specify the result, as TaPs examples in (44) show. Recall Tai's 
contrast between (44) and (45). From the ungrammaticality of (45b) and (45c), Tai 
concludes the necessity of resultant complements. I have some comments on this here. 
His examples 'Vgrind', 'Vknock', and 'Vpoison' in (44) and their nominal counterparts 
seem to have zero-derivations. This phenomenon is quite evident in MC as the 
language lacks overt derivational morphemes to derive nouns from verbs or vice versa. 
Syntactic constructions seem to apply since morphological derivations between nouns 
and verbs are not evident in MC. The prop sal of' light verb' and VP shells (Hale and 
Keyser 1993; Chomsky 1995) has l nkage here. As a light verb is 'a null verb with 
much the same causative interpretation as a verb like make' (Radford 1997: 201), 
theoretically all transitive verbs can be analyzed in connections to light verb and VP 
shells. Light verb and VP shells provide good syntactic constructions to derive verbs 
from nouns and make them causative. Just as Radford's example Vlunch (as in let's 
lunch) shows (1997: 210), Vlunch is formed by merging the noun lunch with a null 
light verb. Similarly, Tai's Chinese examples 'Vgrind', 'Vknock', and 'Vpoison' are derived 
from merging of null light verb and their nominal counterpart. Consequently, the 
resultative could be the natural production of this kind of syntactic derivation, by 
which I would explain the necessity of the resultant predicates in (44). Nevertheless, 
the resultative is not necessary in the case of llt chi 'eat', 1[. gai 'build', 1.?; xie 
'write' and .I hua 'paint' in (39). The use ofPVA 1 Ie, according to Comrie (1976), 
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is sufficient to indicate the completeness of a situation. In (39), PYA modification 
results in a completeness reading: the apple must have been eaten, the two letters must 
have been written ...etc. The partitive readings, in my opinion, should be excluded. 
Tai could argue that there is nothing wrong in adding the resultant state (e.g. 7t wan 
finish) to examples in (39), in order to disambiguate partitive readings from 
completeness readings. He could argue that only by adding the resultant state could 
the partitive readings be disambiguated: the apple is eaten up, the two letters are 
written up ...etc. I would say that the addition of a resultant complement in (39) is not 
ungrammatical; it merely specifies what the result is but it does not affect the status of 
telicity: telicity has been derived by the presence of an increment-theme verb, a 
specified QP and the PYA morpheme J Ie that ensures the completeness readings. 
Therefore, the addition of 7t wan fin ish is semantically redundant in (39). In a nutshell, 
to express telicity in connection with incremental-theme verbs, a result complement is 
obligatory if there is an unspecified QP; it is not obligatory if there is a specified QP. 
Following this train of thought, if those incremental-theme verbs in (36) are atelic 
(according to Tai and Lin), their atelicity is originated from the mass, unspecified QP, 
not from the inherent atelicity in the verbal domain. Following Verkuyl's aspectual 
compositionality (1989; 1993), one could also say that the atelicity in (36) originates 
from the [- SQA] property from the nominal domain, not from the f- ADD TO] 
property from the verbal domain. This can also be explained by Kritka's cumulativity 
and atelicity (1992): the mass nouns (our unspecified QPs) transfer the cumulative 
property to events in homomorphism. Since the sources of atelicity in (36) come from 
the nominal domain, we can doubt whether Lin's claim that Me in general lacks 
mono morphemic telic verbs is true. 
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If those incremental-theme verbs in (36) are atelic, how would the specified QPs 
affect the overall telicity in Me? If there are no monomorphemic telic verbs in Me, 
examples in our (38) and (39) must have [-ADD TO] and [+SQA] under Verkuyl's 
system but they do not produce [+T]. Ifwe assume that they are inherently atelic, how 
would we account for telicity in (38) and (39)? Therefore, Lin's and Tai's claims 
concerning for the lack of monomorphemic telic verbs are too strong and their 
inclusion of resultant complement as the only way to derive telicity in Me fails to 
embrace and account for the aspectual compositionality generally discussed and 
consistently applied in the recent literature. I align with Verkuyl (1989; 1993) and 
Krifka (1992; 1998), suggesting that there are monomorphemic telic verbs in Me and 
they are typically incremental-theme verbs, without exception. 
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Chapter 4 Conclusion 
According to Verkuyl (1989: 40), aspectual compositionality and the establishment of 
predefined verbal categories are not compatible: 'these two things cannot be married 
as they are incompatible: if aspect formation is a process at a structural level it is hard 
to see how a lexical division can be maintained'. In the previous chapters, we have 
seen that various authors still maintain Vendler's quadripartition in their analysis of 
aspectual compositionality. The most important, aspectual property is telicity in the 
verbal domain. Some verbs are inherently telic, while some are not. Inherently telic 
verbs have Verkuyl's [+ADD TO] property, while inherently atelic verbs have his [­
ADD TO] property. The major difference is that Verkuyl did not spell out the name 
for the verbs that have [+ADD TO] and those without. Therefore, as far as telicity at 
the verbal level is concerned, distinctions between accomplishments (particularly the 
incremental-theme verbs) and processes are useful. If the telic-atelic distinctions at the 
verbal level are important to and necessary for the aspectual compositions of VPs and 
the overall sentence, it is not advantageous for them to divorce. 
Processes as an independent global category play an important role in this dissertation. 
As noted in chapter 2, to establish processes as a subcategory of states leaves the 
problem of dynamicity unsolved, while to establish processes as a subcategory of 
events leaves the problem of telicity unanswered. Processes, however, should not be a 
grey area in aspectual classifications. To avoid these problems, it seems logical to 
establish processes as an independent category, and by doing so, I extend the analysis 
of processes to all progressives of any situation types. Progressives of activity and 
accomplishment verbs do not differ essentially, as progressives highlight the internal 
stage and do not focus on the culmination. Though in their non-progressive forms 
86 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
activity and accomplishment verbs should be discriminated wholly from the 
perspective of telicity, their progressive forms are essentially identical. As processes 
are non-culminated in my treatment, whether the unfinished objects would eventually 
exist is not a big issue. By applying Krifka's mappings between events and objects to 
progressives, I would suggest that the mapping from unfinished objects to events 
could only result in unfinished/incomplete events. We could also treat unfinished 
objects as mass nouns because we do not know exactly how much unfinished parts are 
unmapped in the progressive. Treating all progressives as processes could, therefore, 
avoid Dowty's imperfective paradox. 
Concerning the application of telic-atelic distinctions at the verbal level to MC, I have 
pointed out that Tai and Lin overlook the importance of aspectual compositionality. I 
have shown that in these predicates 11-2:; chI tR fan (eat), $ xie ~ zi (write), I. gai 
~ fang -T zi (build) and I: hua I: hua (paint) the origin of their overall atelicity 
comes from the mass noun property of the nominal domain, while maintaining that 
the head of these VPs is incremental-theme verb, which is inherently telic, without 
exceptions. I am not against Lin's and Tai's analyses of telicity based on the 
indispensability of resultant complements. As noted, a resultant complement is 
necessary if a VP has an unspecified QP. I am against the strong version of Lin's and 
Tai's analyses. The resultant complement can derive telicity in MC, but this is not the 
only way. If we have an incremental-theme verb and a specified QP, the aspectual 
interactions will result in a quantized predicate, which derives telicity, according to 
Krifka (1992; 1998). By applying Krifka's quantisation and cumulativity (1992; 1998), 
I think, we can link the aspectua1 analysis ofMC to the current trends of aspectology. 
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The above-mentioned paragraphs serve as a quick summary of the contents of this 
dissertation, and the following paragraphs are devoted to the further extensions and 
suggestions for future research. 
The contrast of Mandarin data in (41e - h) and (42) shows the following pattern: VP 
consists of a V and a QP, and if the QP is dropped as in (41e - h), V becomes 
'unsaturated' in the sense of Frege (1960: 31). Since in Mandarin the internal 
argument should not be unsaturated, it is always occupied by a QP. Because of this, 
the unsaturated position occupied by a QP must be filled; this can also be speculated 
from the following examples of ergative-intransitive verbs as well. An example of 
transitive verbs is added in (471). 
(47) 	 (a) 'f,i ni .:f£ zlii 1~ ZUQ 1t she ftt me ? 
you IVA do what 
What are you doing? 
(b) ft w6 .:f£ zlii ::it z6u [~ IiI]? I * ::it z6u 0 
I IVA walk-road! *walk (without lit) 
I am walking. 
(c) ft w6 .:f£ zlii J£fl. pao [iJi- biI ]? I *J£fl. pao • 
I IVA run foot I * run (without bit) 

I am running. 

(d) ft w6 .:f£ zlii ~ ban *- jia I *11l£ ban 0 
I IVA move homel * move (withoutjiii) 
I am moving. 
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(e) 	 ~ wo 1£ zai !I£.. zha ~~ yan iIN jIng / * !I£.. zha 0 
I IVA blink eyes / *blink (withoutya,ylng) 
I am blinking. 
(f) 	~ wo 1£ zai P-i) he Jk shul/ * P-i) he • 

I IVA drink water / * drink (without shui) 

I am drinking. 

In spite of transitivity or intransitivity, why is the nominal element in (47 b - f) not 
allowed to be dropped? The reason why the nominal element cannot be dropped 
makes sense in (47f): the transitive verb 'drink' will otherwise be unsaturated. But 
why can't it be dropped in (47b - e), since an intransitive verb does not need a 
complement? If the nominal element in (47b - e) is not the complement, what is it? 
Would it be an adjunct? According to Radford's definition of 'adjuncts" they are the 
'optional constituent typically used to specify e.g. the time, place or manner in which 
an event takes place' (Radford 2004: 433). The nominal element in (47 b - e) cannot 
be considered as an adjunct, I think, because they cannot be removed optionally (or 
the sentence will be ungrammatical). If the nominal complement cannot be either a 
complement or an adjunct, what is it? 
One could follow Radford's explanations to solve the problem: unergative predicates 
are transitive verbs, consisting of an abstract light verb and a case less, incorporated 
object, following Baker 1988 (Radford 2004: 349). The presence of the light verb can 
account for the agentive subject of v' (external argument) and the incorporated object 
merges with V to form a VP; forming a uniform VP-shell analysis of both transitive 
and intransitive predicates. One can treat the nominal element in (47 b - e) as an 
incorporated object, but why should the incorporated object be dropped in the 
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following circumstances? 
(48) (a) #J yue It han *ZQU J Ie - yi 0- gong Jt 11 • 
John walk PYA one km 

John walked 1 km. 

(b) #J yue It han lifl. pao J Ie ffi liang * gong Jt Ii • 
John run PYA two km 

John ran 2 km. 

(c) t1 yue ~ han lifl. pao JU dao rM'J kai t pu It dun 0 
John run arrive Cape Town 

John ran to Cape Town (and I arrived in Cape Town). 

S. Bowerman (personal communication) comments on (48). He found the nominal 
expressions in (48) could be considered as 'oblique objects'. Unlike objects that 
undergo change of state (or affected objects (Anderson 1979 cited in Tenny (1994: 
156)), the oblique object 'Cape Town' in (48c) expresses change of location. 
Although John's running eventually leads him to Cape Town, Cape Town is not 
affected at all by John's running. Therefore, an object that undergoes change of 
location does not necessarily undergo change of state. The nominal expression in 
(48a) and (48b) could be the result of John's walking and running, and this result is 
the distance (l km; 2km). Again, the distance as the result is not affected at all by 
John's walking and running. Following S. Bowerman's suggestion, one could also 
say that the nominal expressions in (47) are neither DP complements, nor 
incorporated objects, but oblique objects. The nominal ~ Iii 'road' in *ZQU ~ Iii 
'walk' could refer to 'unspecified distance', so when the distance is specified as in 
(48a), the unspecified distance is replaced by a specified one. This could form a 
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uniform explanation to account for the substitutions of unspecified QPs by specified 
QPs (cf. examples in (36) and (38). However, the nominal aR yan ~ jlng 'eyes' in 
(47e) cannot be analyzed in the same way. S. Bowerman comments on this, 
indicating that MC examples43 like (47e) can be considered as special, idiomatic 
expressions. 
One could say that (48c) is a kind of 'serial verb constructions' (Li and Thompson 
1981: 594), that is, constructions where two or more separate events have the same 
underlying subject (ibid.). I translate (48c) as 'John ran to Cape Town and arrived in 
Cape Town', because JifL pac 'run' and jU dAo 'arrive' form two separate events and 
these two events have the same subject 'John' and the same oblique object 'Cape 
Town'. However, if one follows Li and Thompson (1981), one serious problem could 
occur: John is the AGENT argument of the unergative predicate44 'run' and is also 
the THEME argument of the unaccusative predicate 45 'arrive'. This violates 
Chomsky's Theta-Criterion (1981: 36), which states that 'each argument bears one 
and only one a-role, and each a-role is assigned to one and only one argument'. In 
(48c), the same argume t, John, has two different a-roles. Clearly, to analyze (48c) 
from the perspectives of serial verb constructions will result in theoretical 
contradictions to Chomsky'S Theta-Criterion. 
43 There are more examples of this kind, for instance, tEl pili 'clap' -'f- shou 'hands' (clap), ~ 
zhou 'frown' ,; mei j;i tou 'forehead' (frown), 11- shang 'hurt' J'\.' xin 'heart' (sad). I found 
expressions like these have connections with body parts. 
44 Unergative predicates typically bear one argument, that is, AGENT argument as the syntactic 

subject (Radford 2004: 256). 

45 Unaccusative predicates typically bear one argument, that is, THEME argument as the syntactic 

subject. (Radford 2004: 256). 
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Instead of proposing serial verb constructions as a solution to (48c), S. Bowerman 
suggests that there is a null-case pronoun (PRO) in (48c): Johni ran PRO j arrive (in) 
Cape Town. PRO is thus the required subject of the one-place predicate' arrive', and 
John is the antecedent of PRO (controlled by John). Instead of treating (48c) as two 
conjunct clauses 'John ran to Cape Town' and 'John arrived in Cape Town', the 
'control clause' (Radford 2004: 108) 'arrive (in) Cape Town' functions as the 
complement of 'John ran', implying 'John ran in order to arrive in Cape Town'. 
According to Radford (ibid.), verbs that 'allow an infinitive complement with a PRO 
subject are said to function as control verbs', 'run' is unlikely to be a control verb. 
The problem centres on complement. I don't think that verbs like 'run' can have a 
'control clause' (ibid.). There is no such a way in MC to say'John ran Mary to arrive 
in Cape Town' (CL John wants Mary to run to Cape Town). This leads us back to the 
problem ofcomplement and unergative verbs. 
I found these problems when I was collecting MC examples to derive 
accomplishments from processes in the last section of chapter 3. Although these 
problems seem to be not really relevant to the aspectual compositionality and event 
classifications discussed in this dissertation, nevertheless, I think they are connected 
to aspect and argument structure (cf. Tenny 1994). I do not have solutions for these 
problems now, but they can serve as the direction for my future research. 
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